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ABSTRACT
Federal involvement in the shipping industry dates back
to 1789. Since then, governmental efforts to promote the
American merchant marine have taken a variety of forms,
including the prohibition of foreign shipping from the
coastwise trade. To this end, laws have been enacted which
deal with specific activities considered to be coastwise
trade in nature and which ban the use of foreign-flag and,
in some cases, foreign-built ships from those activities.
However, the laws are narrowly worded and archaic, and
have been unable to adequately address modern trends in
coastal commerce. Maritime service industries have emerged
in recent years which are associated with such coastal
activities as passenger cruises and oil and gas exploration.
Because federal law has not dealt with these specific
coastal service activities, the coastwise trade laws have
not been applied to them, and they may be undertaken by
ships of any flag. Without a modern legal framework to
govern cabotage activities, much of the' recent coastwise
trade policy of the United States has been formulated by
federal courts and agencies.
At present, the U.S. coastwise trade laws are applied
.to the navigable waters of the United States and, with
certain exceptions, its districts, territories and
possessions. In addition, the cabotage principle extends to
artificial islands on the outer continental shelf which are
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in place for the purpose of oil and gas exploitation.
Moreover, the requirements for participation in this trade
stipulate that the vessel be domestically constructed,
owned, and documented. Unfortunately, such ships are
usually more expensive to operate than foreign ships, and
consequently there is an inherent conflict between the users
of coastal marine services, who seek them at the lowest
possible cost, and the traditional public policy of the
United States, which has been to encourage the growth of its
own fleet.
It is proposed that two changes to the existing policy
regarding the coastwise trade be pursued. The first is to
include all coastal maritime commercial services within the
purview of the U.S. coastwise trade. The second is to
remove the U.S. construction requirement from some or all of
the ships participating in that trade.
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
This is a study of U.S. public policy relating to the
American coastwise trade. The legal framework governing
participation in the coastwise trade will be examined, with
particular emphasis on the pertinent vessel documentation,
construction, and ownership requirements. Other aspects of
federal regulation of the coastwise trade, such as vessel
inspection and rate regulation, will not be addressed.
Much of the existing body of literature focuses on
shipping policy in the context of the foreign trades, and it
is submitted that U.S. coastwise trade policy deserves
closer attention. 1 The purpose of the study, therefore, is
twofold. First, it will lay a foundation for further study
devoted exclusively to U.S. coastwise trade policy.
Second, it will point out shortcomings in the present policy
toward the coastwise trade. These shortcomings include
inconsistent and contradictory holdings by federal agencies
and courts, and a failure by Congress to effectively
regulate emerging de.velopments in the coastwise trade.
U.S. federal maritime policy is essentially a balance
between private interests which seek to procure Shipping
services at the best rate on the world market and the
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interests of the nation as a whole in preserving the ability
to construct, operate, and crew ships for national security
reasons. 2 Accordingly, federal law has attempted to
promote the American merchant marine while at the same time
allowing cargo shippers at least some choice in what carrier
they may use. An early example of this compromise between
the interests of shippers and the promotion of the maritime
industry is a 1789 law that imposed discriminatory tonnage
duties on foreign carriers arriving at U.S. ports. 3
Sh1ppers were free to choose ships of any nationality to
transport their cargo in both the foreign and coastwise
trade, although the discriminatory tonnage duties made it
cheaper to use U.S.-built and -owned ships, and thereby
encouraged their use.
A variety of federal maritime promotional programs have
emerged since the 1789 law that imposed discriminatory
tonnage duties on foreign Ships.4 Among the oldest is the
exclusion of foreign shipping from the American coastwise
trade. a policy that has been in effect without interruption
since 1817. 5 This policy was probably modelled after a
British Navigation Act dating from the mid 17th century, the
purpose of which was to "reserve to British ships the
coasting trade of the British Isles, from ... one port or
creek ... to another port or creek 06 The reservation
of the coastwise trade.toAmerican ships played an important
role in the development of the post-Revolutionary War
merchant marine at a time when the nation depended heavily
on the shipping industry for transportation, communication,
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and economic and strategic development. 7
For the purpose of this study. coastwise trade is
defined as transportation, dredging, towing, and salvage
services that are performed in the navigable waters of the
United States. its territories, districts, and possessions.
including the territorial sea and points established on the
Outer Continental Shelf COCS) for the purpose of developing,
producing, or exploring for mineral resources. An attempt
will be made to determine whether existing American
cabotage law applies to these activities in the coastwise
area outlined above and, if not, whether it should be
applicable. 8 No distinction is made in this study between
coastwise trade, intercoastal trade, and noncontiguous
trade, all of which relate to trade between points in the
coastwise area. 9
The term coastwise trade has never been defined by a
statute or an agency regulation. There is no U.S. policy
that clearly enumerates which activities undertaken in which
specific geographic areas comprise the coastwise trade. The
consequence is that the U.S. Customs Service, Department of
the Treasury, which has the responsibility for day to day
oversight of the coastwise trade laws, must judge whether an
operation is coastwise trade in nature based on an
evaluation of individual statutes. It is suggested that
Customs' understanding of. which activities constitute
coastwise trade is too narrow and that foreign ships are
able to perform services in the coastwise area that should
be reserved to American ships. Examples of this include
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cruises-to-nowhere and certain oil rig support activities,
such as icebreaking and anchor handling. While such
activities as the shipment of oil between U.S. ports clearly
fall within the purview of the coastwise trade, other
activities are less easily defined. For example, should
dredging be part of the coastwise trade? Moreover, should
such activities as the performance of specialized oil rig
support services on the Outer Continental Shelf and cruises
to nowhere be part of the coastwise trade?
Customs has looked for the answers to these questions
in the antiquated statutes that form the existing body of
coastwise trade law. These statutes include section 27 of
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (the Jones Act),lO and the
Act of June 19, 1886 (Passenger Ship Act),ll respectively
regulating the transport ,of merchandise and passengers.
They are, for the most part, narrowly worded laws that leave
little rOOm for agency flexibility. On the one hand, such
wording is indicative of the tenacity with which the
coastwise trade has been reserved for U.S. vessels. On the
other hand, the statutes do not allow Customs to respond to
technological developments in coastwise services which early
policymakers could not have foreseen.
The other federal agency concerned with administering
the coastwise trade laws is the U.S. Coast Guard, Department
of Transportation. The Coast Guard issues a coastwise
license to any qualified vessel that engages in the
coastwise trade, as determined by Customs. The
qualifications a ship must possess in order to be issued a
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license will be outlined in subsequent chapters, but
essentially the ship must be constructed in the United
States and its owners must be U.S. citizens.
There is an evolving maritime service industry in the
coastwise area extending to the OUter Continental Shelf that
includes icebreaking, rig inspection, dredging, passenger
excursions and other activities of which transportation
services are only a part. Understandably, the drafters of
the Jones Act and other early coastwise trade laws could not
have envisioned the changes in technology and consumer taste
that have taken place in recent years .. Would they have
perceived these new maritime services as being within the
purview of American coastwise trade law? One cannot be
certain. However, unless the term coastwise trade is
clearly defined, it is likely that the confusion surrounding
its application will continue. Worse, it may allow foreign
operators to gain a foothold in developing U.S. coastwise
service markets that should be reserved to American ships.
-6-
NOTES
1. See for example John G. B. Hutchins, The American Maritime
Industries and Public Policy. 1789-1914. New York: Russell
& Russell, 1941,641 pp., hereafter cited as Hutchins; A. C.
Denison, America's Maritime History. New York: G. B.
Putnam's Sons, 1944,236 pp., hereafter cited as Denison;
Samuel A. Lawrence, United States Merchant Shippin~ Policies
and Politics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966.
405 pp., hereafter cited as Lawrence.
2. In his second annual State of the Union address in 1790,
George Washington urged Congress to consider the detrimental
effect that a war could have on the United States, both
economically and strategically, without a strong American
merchant fleet. This policy has been maintained to the
present time, and is embodied in the declaration of policy
of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 and the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936. The text may be found in Fred L. Israel, ed.,
~tate of the Union Messa~es of the Presidents. 1790-1966.
vol. 1, New York: Chelsea House - Robert Hector Publishers,
1966, pp. 4-7.
3. Act of July 20, 1789, ch, 3, 1 Stat. 27. A tonnage duty was
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a tax assessed on a ship based on its tonnage. Under the
law, a U.S.-built, U.S.-owned ship paid a duty of six cents
per ton. A U.S.-built, foreign-owned ship paid a duty of
thirty cents per ton. A foreign-built, foreign-owned ship
paid a duty of fifty cents per ton. Moreover, U.S.-built,
U.S.-owned ships in the coastwise trade paid the duty only
once per year, whereas foreign-owned and -built ships paid
it each time they entered port.
4. For example, several cargo preference statutes reserve part
or all of certain cargoes transported in the U.S. foreign
commerce to U.S. ships. In addition, the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 established direct operating and construction
subsidies, as well as a loan guarantee program and a tax
deferral program to spur Shipbuilding.
5. The Act of March 1, 1817, ch. 31, sec. 4, 3 Stat. 351,
hereafter cited as 1817 act.
6. Great Navigation Act, October 8, 1651. There was a
subsequent increase in the growth of the British shipping
industry which was attributed to this law. Denison, pp.
47,60. It is interesting to note that Britain is now one of
the few maritime nations that does not reserve its coastwise
trade to domestic ships.
7. Statistics show that the tonnage of the coastwise fleet more
than tripled in the 12 year period 1789-1800, from 68,607
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tons in 1789 to 245,295 tons in 1800. See also Lawrence, p.
32, and Hutchins, pp. 3-4.
8. Coastwise trade is sometimes differentiated from cabotage
for at least two reasons. First, many writers refer to
coastwise trade as the movement along the same coast, as
opposed to intercoastal trade (for example, between the
Atlantic and Pacific Coasts), and noncontiguous or domestic
offshore trade (for example, between the mainland and Puerto
Rico or Hawaii). On the other hand, cabotage is often
considered to encompass all these trades. Second, cabotage
may include other forms of transport, such as air movement,
whereas coastwise trade is confined to maritime activity.
Cabotage is defined in Webster's Ninth New Colle~iate
Dict~onary (Merriam-Webster, 1983) as deriving from the
French word caboter -to sail along the coast (1831) and
to trade or transport in coastal waters or airspace or
between two points within a country. The word may have its
origin in the Spanish cabo or cape. Oppenheim, Law
Quarterly Reyiew p. 329, Webster's New Twentieth Century
Dict1Qnary Qf ~he Enilish Laniuaie. Unabridged, 2nd Edition,
1977. Black's Law Dictionary defines cabotage as
"navigation from cape to cape along the coast without going
out into the open sea." Black's Law Dict1onary. 5th Ed.
That volume further defines coasting.trade as "commerce and
navigation between different places along the coast of the
United States." Id. It is maintained, moreover, that "in
international law, cabotage is identified with coasting
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trade so that it means navigating and trading along the
coasts between the ports thereof." Id.
9. Noncontiguous trade has traditionally meant trade to U.S.
offshore areas, such as Alaska and Hawaii, and intercoastal
trade has implied shipping between different coasts, such as
the Gulf to Pacific coast trade.
The "coasting trade," a term used in early statutes,
has been equated with "coastwise trade" by the Federal
courts. Ravesies v. U.S., 37 Fed. Rep. 447, Circuit Court,
S. D. Alabama, (1889). Further, the term "cabotage" will
be used interchangeably with coastwise trade.
10. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, sec. 27, ch. 250, 41 Stat.
999. For the purposes of this study, the Jones Act will
refer only to section 27 of this Act.
11. Act of June 19, 1886, sec. 8, ch. 421, 24 Stat. 81.
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Chapter II
DOCUMENTATION LAW
Among the earliest forms of federal regulation of the
shipping industry was the regulation of vessel
documentation. Vessel documentation, among other things,
indicates .the nationality of a ship. In the U.S., vessel
documentation indicates the trades in which the ship may be
employed and is also an important method by which federal
maritime policy is implemented. 1 The documentation of a
U.S. vessel is essentially a classification procedure
whereby the ship's tax status, and safety, trade, and
pilotage requirements, among other things, can be
determined. 2 Vessel documentation has been a function of
the Coast Guard since it was transferred there from Customs
in 1967.
For the purpose of this study, the role that
documentation plays in regulating the participation of ships
in the coastwise trade is the central issue. Under the
present documentation procedures, essentially two questions
are answered in the affirmative before a license may be
issued for operation in the coastwise trade (see Appendix A,
p. 190). The first is whether a ship is eligible for
documentation. Provided that the vessel is at least five
net tons in size and is owned by an American citizen, it is
eligible for documentation. 3 The second is whether the
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vessel is eligible for a license. In order for this to be
answered in the affirmative, the ship must be U.S.-built and
must meet more stringent ownership requirements. 4 Only
ships for which a license has been issued are allowed to
engage in the coastwise trade. 5
History of vessel Documentation
The policy of requiring ships of U.S. nationality to be
documented as such extends back to the beginning of the
federal government. For ships in the foreign trade, the
policy had the benefit of extending "the rights, privileges,
and immunities of that nation and the international comity
attendant with international law and diplomacy ... " to that
Ship.6 For ships in the coastwise trade, documentation
had the initial benefit of exempting them from the payment
of high tonnage duties, as stated earlier.
The U.S. Department of Treasury, concerned with the
collection of revenue from tonnage taxes assessed on ships
and import duties assessed on foreign merchandise, employed
"collectors" along the coast who were responsible for
issuing ship documents, processing ships arriving in the
local ports, and collecting revenues that might be due.
These collectors were established by an Act of Congress in
1789, and they were responsible, in part, "for the due
collection of duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships
and vessels ... ,,7
In 1789, the first law was adopted regarding vessel
documentation, and it required that ships registered under
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the U.S. flag be both U.S.-built and u.S.-owned. 8 The
requirement that vessels documented under this law be
U.S.-built has been seen as an important concession to
shipbuilding interests at the time and it represented the
beginning of a shipbuilding-ship operating partnership that
lasted until the early twentieth century.9 Although this
early Act distinguished between documentation for the
purposes of the foreign trade and the coastwise trade. it
was not until three years later that the documentation
procedures for the two trades were clearly defined. 10
In 1792. Congress enacted a law that established
documentation procedures for shipS in the foreign trade and
several months later enacted a separate law outlining
documentation procedures for ships in the coastwise
trade. 11 Specifically. U.S.-flag ships in the foreign
trade were required to obtain a registry and ships in the
coastwise trade were required to obtain an enrollment and
license. These two statutes were extremely detailed. each
specifying the exact wording of the appropriate document.
and although the specificity was probably necessary at the
time to effectively administer the laws, the inflexibility
was to become a problem for the administering agency by the
1960s. 12 At any rate. a separate. clear system for the
documentation of ships for the foreign and coastwise trades
had been set up that became the basis for establishing the
nationality of American ships and indicating the trades in
which they might be employed. There was no difference in
the requirements for the two types of documentation. so that
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a ship that was eligible for the foreign trade would also be
eligible for the coastwise trade. It was permissible for a
shipowner to move vessels back and forth between the
coastwise and foreign trades as long as he secured the
appropriate document for that trade. 13
U.S. policy toward the foreign and coastwise trades was
beginning to develop separately by the late 1790s. Evidence
of this is the fact that U.S. ships registered for the
foreign trade were no longer accorded the lower tonnage fee
status that ships in the coastwise trade were. 14 This
meant that registered ships had to pay a higher tonnage fee
upon entering U.S. ports than did coastwise vessels.
Several issues began to emerge as a concern to early
legislators considering the registry law of 1792. First, it
was reported that foreigners had been evading the paYment of
the higher tonnage duties normally assessed on foreign ships
by illegally maintaining that their ships were American. 15
A specific measure was included in the law which required
the master of a ship arriving from abroad to make an oath
regarding the ownership of the vessel. It was felt that
this would help ascertain the true nationality of the ship
so that the proper tonnage duties could be applied.
A second issue was a section allowing the registry of
ships captured as war prizes and forfeitures. 16
Specifically, for the first time, it was permissible to
register ships that had been captured as war prizes or
forfeited under U.S. law, even if they were not U.S.-built.
This measure was probably part of the effort to build up the
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fleet and, although it met with some resistance in Congress,
it was incorporated in the 1792 law and remains in effect
today. 17
A further issue was the transfer of tonnage to and from
foreign-flags. The 1792 law made it illegal to register a
ship unless it had been owned by an American since May 16,
1789. 18 Therefore, even if a ship was built in the U.S.,
it could not be registered unless its entire period of
ownership after May 16, 1789 was by an American citizen.
Rather than discouraging the transfer of ships to the U.S.
flag, the provision was probably intended to discourage the
transfer of U.S.-flag ships to foreign countries for
convenience purposes, since they would not be permitted to
transfer back to the U.S. flag.
Panama Canal Act of 1912
Construction and ownership requirements for American
ships in the coastwise and foreign trades remained identical
until early in the 20th century, when two significant
changes to U.S. maritime policy caused the requirements for
foreign and coastwise trade documentation to diverge
sharply. First, a 1920 law changed the ownership standard
so that when an American corporation registered a ship for
the foreign trade, a majority of the stock had to be
U.S.-owned, whereas a corporation enrolling a ship for the
coastwise trade had to be 75% u.s.-owned. 19 This change
will be addressed later in this chapter.
The second change was that under the Panama Canal Act
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of 1912, U.S.-flag ships in the foreign trade no longer had
to be U.S.-built. 20 This provision was known as the "free
ship" bill because it allowed shipowners to purchase ships
on the world market. It was the culmination of over forty
years of efforts by shipowners to have such a measure
enacted. The problem began during the Civil War, when some
750,000 tons of U.S. shipping were sold to foreign owners to
avoid capture or slnking. 21 The owners of these vessels
were prohibited from repurchasing them or reflagging
foreign-owned ships, and the effect was to wipe out one
third of the U.S. fleet engaged in the foreign trade. 22
This fact, combined with the emergence of Great Britain as a
builder of iron-hulled steamships brought about an
increasing pressure from ship-operating interests to allow
the purchase of ships on the world market. The perception
among these interests was that the traditional alliance of
shipbuilders and ship-operators -- whereby U.S.-flag ships
had to be U.S.-built -- was a useful alliance while
U.S.-built ships were competitive in price and technology,
but it had effectively stifled the redevelopment of the U.S.
fleet after the Civil War. 23 Thus, by 1910, the coastwise
fleet was estimated to comprise nearly 90% of the total U.S.
merchant marine.
The events which led to the passage of the "free ship"
bill for vessels in the foreign trade also had an impact on
ships in the coastwise trade. The withdrawal of friendly
shipping at the outbreak of World War I and the lack of
available U.S.-flag tonnage to provide Shipping services for
-16-
the U.S. foreign trades created a vacuum into which were
drawn 300,000 tons of coastwise tonnage. 24 This, in turn,
caused a shortage of ships providing coastwise serv1ce and
paved the way for an emergency measure that allowed
foreign-flag ships to operate in the coastwise trade during
the War. 25
The Panama Canal Act also allowed the importation, free
of duty, of all foreign materials used in the construction
or repair of U.S.-built ships. These ships could be used in
the coastwise trade and could apply for cargo contracts
under the Ocean Mail Aot of 1891, a cargo preference law for
U.S. Ships.26 Other early laws had allowed limited
importation of duty free materials for shipbuilding, and to
some extent, these measures represented temporary
accommodations to both the ship operating and shipbuilding
industries, since U.S.~built ships were still required under
U.S.-flag operation. 27 A Congressional Committee that
investigated the problems of the Merchant Marine in 1870
argued that a "free ship" policy, among other things, would
be detrimental to American labor, and that the ships would
not be purchased abroad unless they had coastwise privileges
anyway.28 In siding with the shipbuilding interests, the
Committee proposed admitting duty free materials for
shipbuilding, as stated above, thereby benefitting the
shipyards because of the lower cost of imported
materials. 29
A major concern of those opposed to the "free ship"
policy was the possibility that foreign-built shipS might
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find their way into the coastwise trade. In Congressional
debate over the free-ship policy in 1886, Congressman
Dingley stated that "if it were proposed to limit the
free-ship policy to vessels for the foreign trade, some
persons ... might fail to recognize the certainty that the
granting of free ships for the foreign trade would assuredly
soon result in free ships for the coastwise trade. ,,30 A
letter was included in the Con~ressional Record during this
debate from the Maritime Association of New York to the same
effect, and it pointed out the concern of some sectors of
the maritime industry that foreign-built ships would
eventually find their way into the coastwise trade. 31
A similar point was made by those who objected to the
free-ship provisions of the Panama Canal Act inasmuch as
foreign-built ships purchased under the authority of the Act
might prove to be unprofitable in the foreign trades,
increasing the pressure to allow such ships to enter the
coastwise trade. 32 Moreover, the legislative history of
the law shows that an earlier bill dealing with the sUbject
of foreign building stated that "foreign-built vessels
registered pursuant to this act shall not engage in the
coastwise trade or transport from one port of the United
States to another port of the United States either direct or
via fore~~n ports or for any part of the yoya~e, passen~ers
or merQhandise ... "(emphasis added)33·
The language used in H.R. 8765 is a great deal stronger
than that incorporated into the statute because it
specifically prohibits the use of foreign-built vessels to
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carry passengers and merchandise in the coastwise trade. and
it points out clearly the concerns of maritime policymakers
that only U.S.-built ships be used in coastwise service.
The "nose of the camel under the tent" fear has been
one of the traditional arguments against allowing the use of
foreign-built ships in any portion of trades normally
reserved for qualified U.S. ships. This may be one of the
primary reasons that it took over 40 years for a free-ship
bill to become law, although it is significant that in the
74 years sUbsequent to the enactment of the free-ship law,
the protection of the coastwise trade to U.S.-built ships
has been maintained.
At any rate, the clear intent of the Panama Canal Act
was to allow the registry of foreign-built ships for the
foreign trades only. This policy is still valid, despite
the concerns of opponents of a "free ship" policy.
Therefore, the policy regarding documentation of U.S. ships
engaged in the coastwise trade, as outlined in the Act of
February 18, 1793, remained essentially intact until the
Vessel Documentation Act of 1980. 34
The Vessel Documentation Act of 1980
The Vessel Documentation Act recodified the law
pertaining to coastwise documentation, although it made no
change to the policy objectives of the existing
documentation laws. 35 In simple and straightforward
language the law stipulates that in order to engage in the
coastwise trade a ship must have a coastwise license. 36
-19-
Further, in order to get a coastwise license, a ship must be
"eligible for documentation" and be U.S.-built. 37 In
order to be eligible for documentation, the vessel must be
at least five net tons and be U.S.-owned. 38
The stated purpose of the law, was to "improve
procedures and increase efficiency" in laws that were nearly
two hundred years old and viewed by many in the
administration and Congress to be exceptionally archaic and
complex. 39 Therefore, the Vessel Documentation Act sought
to improve the administrative flexibility of ship
documentation that previously was perceived as adversely
affecting the efficiency of the maritime industry through
unnecessary paperwork and reporting burdens. 40 The House
Report was careful to point out that "the distinction
between 'registered' vessels, those engaged in the foreign
trade, and 'licensed' vessels, those engaged in the coasting
trade, is carefully preserved in the bill. ,,41 Further, it
was made clear that the prohibition of foreign-built,
U.S.-flag vessels engaging in the coastwise trade, a
provision made necessary by the "free-ship" portion of the
Panama Canal Act, was felt to be important enough to retain,
even though it was somewhat redundant. 42 As will be seen
in the following Chapter, the individual coastwise trade
laws also contain specific prohibitions against the
operation of foreign-built and foreign-flag vessels in the
coastwise trade and these individual prohibitions
essentially repeat the ban on foreign coastwise
participation that is set forth in the documentation law.
-20-
Based on the legislative history of the Vessel
Documentation Act, therefore, it is clear that no change in
the documentation policy of the U.S. -- one nearly as old as
the country itself -- was intended. The major thrust of
this policy is that in order for a ship to be documented to
engage in the coastwise trade, she must be U.S.-built and
U.S.-owned. It is perhaps indicative of the strong feelings
of protection toward this trade that U.S. policy-makers
would intentionally recodify redundant statutes.
The Act created certain classes of documentation for
vessels, depending on the trade in which they are used. The
classes of documentation include fishery license, Great
Lakes license, limited coastwise license, pleasure vessel
license, and temporary documentation for vessels procured
outside the United States. A registry may be issued to a
vessel engaged in the foreign trade, in trade with certain
U.S. possessions, and "in other employments for which a
coastwise license or Great Lakes license or fishery license
is not required. n43 A registry, as stated, is issued for
employment in the foreign trades, although it is not
required for that employment. A registered vessel may also
be endorsed to engage in the coastwise trade, the Great
Lakes trade, or the fisheries, provided that the vessel
meets the requirements for these trades. 44 A
U.S.-registered, non U.S.-built vessel may not be endorsed
for the coastwise trade.
Since it is beyond the scope of this study, the
specific requirements for documents other than the coastwise
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license will not be addressed, although it should be
mentioned that because of peculiar geographic circumstances
associated with trade on the Great Lakes, a separate
licensing system evolved for that trade. An 1864 statute
provided a separate classification system for ships
"navigating the waters on the northern, northeastern, and
northwestern frontiers, otherwise than by sea ... ", such
that these ships could simultaneously engage in the
coastwise and foreign trades, provided they were confined to
the Great Lakes and met other requirements for U.S.
Ships.45 This law was incorporated in the Vessel
Documentation Act with a notable change in that vessels
obtaining a Great Lakes license must now meet the same
requirements as a ship obtaining a coastwise license. 46
~li~ibility for Documentation
Ownership
U.S. citizen ownership of a vessel has been a
prerequisite to American documentation since September 1,
1789. In addition, corporate "citizens" have been allowed
to enroll and license ships for the coastwise trade since
the 1800s and, in fact, the sale of the company's shares to
foreigners did not affect the coastwise eligibilty of the
ship.47 This eventually provided an access for f~reign
interests to U.S. protected trades and was to become a
contentious issue by the end of World War I.
The eligibility requirement of the Vessel Documentation
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Act of 1980 is set forth in section 12102 of title 46. In
order for a vessel to be eligible for documentation, it must
be at least five net tons and it must be owned by a u.S.
citizen, corporation, or a state or federal government. 48
Assuming one of the ownership requirements is met, the
Secretary of Transportation is required to issue a
certificate of documentation upon application by the
owner49 (see Appendix B, p. 192). In the case of vessel
ownership by a corporation or partnership, U.S. law
distinguishes between the minimum required amount of U.S.
citizen involvement in coastwise operations versus foreign
trade operations. Specifically, a corporation owning a
registered ship must have at least a majority of U.S.
citizens on its board of directors. Likewise, a majority of
the controlling interest of a partnership must be owned by
U.S. citizens. However, the Coast Guard regulations
indicate that a simple majority ownership of vessels in the
coastwise trade is not sufficient. Rather, American
individuals must hold 75% of the controlling interest or
directorships, as the case may be. 50 Authority for this
regulation may be found in the Shipping Act of 1916, as
amended in 1920, which mandates that 75% of the stock,
voting power whether direct or indirect, or any other means
of control had to be owned by or vested in U.S.
citizens51 (see Appendix C, p. 193).
Such language suggests a relatively protective attitude
toward the coastwise trade. The Shipping Act of 1916 had
stipUlated that a controlling interest of shipowning
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corporations be owned by U.S. citizens. During the
formulation of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, which
amended the 1916 ownership requirements so that 75% of the
corporation had to be U.S.-owned, the U.S. Shipping Board
held that "it is through the corporation or association
holding American tonnage that the door is opened to
foreigners. ,,52 Moreover, the Shipping Board was of the
opinion that "unless our coasting fleet be wholly and
unequivocally owned by loyal American citizens, it can not
be rated a dependable unit in time of national
emergency. ,,53
Whereas the 1916 Act had classified corporations and
associations as u.S. citizens and mandated that the
"controlling interest" be U.S.-owned, certain groups. such
as the U.S. Shipping Board, sought to strengthen the
ownership requirements by mandating that 100% of the stock
and voting power be owned by or vested in U.S. citizens and
that the president and directors of the companies be u.S.
citizens as well. In fact, this language was made part of
the House bill, although through the political process it
was diluted to allow 25% foreign investment in coastwise
operations.
Clearly, the concern had developed during this period
that foreign investment in U.S. protected trades was growing
through the use of dummy corporations and that this
investment might be detrimental to U.S. interests should an
emergency arise. Further, emergency war legislation
allowing foreign-flag ships to operate in the coastwise
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trade contributed to the presence of foreign interests.
It 1s likely that foreign interests are still able to
become involved in U.S. coastwise operations through
sophisticated time charter arrangements with U.S.-based
companies that hold the title to coastwise-qualified
vessels. 54 Moreover, when the stocks of major banks are
traded publicly, it is unclear what would prevent foreign
citizens from owning more than 25% of a bank -- and of any
vessel to which it holds the title on any given day and
whether, in fact, that contingency would disqualify ships
owned by that company from engaging in the coastwise trade.
Perhaps a relevant question at this point is whether
and to what extent foreign investment in the U.S. coastwise
trade is detrimental. Are the concerns of 1920 over
compromising national security by allowing foreign
investment in the coastwise trade still valid? Given the
fact that these vessels are rarely, if ever, in foreign
waters, and under no circumstances employ foreign crews, it
may be that national security is not compromised to the
extent previously thought by allowing foreign investment in
the coastwise trade. Further, the economic benefits in
terms of employment to seafarers and shipbuilders have been
viewed by some as worth the potential security risk. 55
Moreover, if the rationale for domestic ownership is
national security, there may be little need for domestic
ownership of coastwise vessels, since an American crew in
U.S. waters is far more likely to obey the requisition
orders of the U.S. in the time of an emergency than those of
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a distant foreign owner. 56
Title Requirements
In addition to the stipulation that the present owner
of a ship in the coastwise trade be an American citizen, the
Coast Guard requires that all the previous owners of that
ship be O.S. citizens, in order to qualify for coastwise
documentation. 57 Any ship that has at some point in its
history been owned by a foreign national or has sailed under
a foreign flag is permanently barred from re-entering
coastwise service. This continuous "chain of title" policy
dates back to 1935 and is attributable to a concern that the
O.S. shipbuilding industry would suffer from a lack of
orders if existing U.S.~built, foreign-owned or -flag ships
were renationalized for coastwise service. 58 This issue
will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter Five.
Build Requirement
September 1, 1789 marked the beginning of the federal
policy that required U.S.-flag ships to be domestically
built. That has been carried forward to the present,
although the statutes have never gone further in describing
exactly what constitutes "U.S.-built." While it is not the
intention to document the interpretive history of this
provision, a few words might be said about its present
status. Prior to the Vessel Documentation Act, Coast Guard
regulations did not specify exactly what constituted
U.S.-built, and this caused some confusion as to the degree
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to which foreign-origin materials could legally be used in a
U.S.-built ship. In addition, there was some ambiguity
regarding the geographic area within which a "U.S.-built"
ship had to be assembled. 59
The Coast Guard, in interpreting the statutory wording
of the 1980 Act regarding U.S.-build, has ruled that all
major components of a vessel's hull and superstructure must
be fabricated in the U.S. and it must be entirely assembled
in the U.S. as well. 60 The agency had originally ruled,
however, that at least 50% of a Ship's non-integral
machinery and components had to have been procured in the
U.S., although this standard was eliminated because it was
held to be "not necessary to determine the source of
machinery and other components which are not an integral
part of the hull or superstructure in order to determine
whether a vessel is considered 'built in the United
States' ... 61
It is clear, therefore, that U.S. coastwise trade
policy was intended to protect the interests of shipbuilders
as well as Ship operators. For nearly two hundred years,
U.S.-flag ships in the coastwise trade have been U.S.-built,
as required by law. Despite the perception that the use of
foreign-built ships in the foreign trade would carryover to
the coastwise trade, that has not happened.
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Chapter III
COASTWISE TRADE LAW
The rules which govern participation in the coastwise
trade have been discussed; attention now turns to the more
difficult task of determining what, exactly, the coastwise
trade is. This Chapter will examine the legal framework
surrounding transportation, dredging, towing and salvage
services in U.S. waters, and how that framework has evolved
-- or remained static in the face of changing trends in
coastal services.
Federal power to enact laws regulating shipping in the
navigable waters stems from the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution, which gives to Congress the
power " to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states ... "1 The constitutional power to
regulate commerce was used as early as the second act of the
first Congress, when a law was enacted that laid a duty on
imported goods, wares, and merchandise. 2 Congress began
exercising its power to regulate the coastwise trade in the
first Congress as well by enacting a law imposing
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discriminating tonnage duties on ships that were not
domestically constructed and owned. In fact, early maritime
policy was an outgrowth of concerns over the economic and
security well-being of the nation as a whole, and therefore
was formulated on the national level. 3 Efforts by state
and local governments to regulate commerce in their
navigable waters were rejected by the courts as being
contrary to the federal authority granted by the
Constitution to regulate commerce between states and with
foreign nations.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, an early case challenging
Congress' constitutional right to regulate commerce, an
exclusive contract was awarded by the State of New York to
an operator to navigate in New York state waters. 4 It was
maintained by the State of New York that the 1793 Act was
unconstitutional, because the language of the Constitution
allowing Congress to regulate commerce did not also apply to
navi~ation. The Supreme Court held that the term commerce
as used in the Constitution did include navigation, and that
the U.S. government had the sole power to regulate the
activity. Chief Justice Marshall stated that:
"if commerce does not include navigation, the
government of the Union has no direct power over
that subject, and can make no law prescribing
what shall constitute American vessels, or
requiring that they shall be navigated by
American seamen. Yet this power has been
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exercised from the commencement of the
government, has been exercised with the consent
of a.ll ... ,,5
The opinion also stated that the wording of the
Constitution might be construed by some to exclude federal
power when the commerce is solely within the boundaries of a
particular state, because the power extends to commerce
"among the several states." However, it was noted that in
foreign commerce, federal power must extend within the state
jurisdictional line to the innermost reaches of that
commerce; likewise, in interstate commerce, the federal
power to regulate the activity would be meaningless if its
jurisdiction did not extend inside the state boundary to the
end-point of that commerce. Therefore, according to the
court, the federal government must have the power to
regulate commerce ~ navigation within the boundaries of
any state if it is part of the interstate or foreign trade
of the United States. Moreover, the court reasoned that the
individual states are not entitled to regulate the commerce
and navigation within their boundaries if there is any
conflict with federal jurisdiction, and awarding an
exclusive navigation contract to a single operator was
deemed to be such a conflict.
The Supreme Court mad~ a similar ruling in 1893, when
it held unconstitutional a Chicago municipal tax levied on
coastwise operators for the privilege of navigating the
Chicago River. 6 The court held, in agreeing with Gibbons
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v. Ogden, that navigable waters that are within a state, and
that connect "with other navigable waters so as to form a
waterway to other states or foreign nations, cannot be
obstructed or impeded so as to impair, defeat or place any
\
burden upon a right to their navigation granted by
Congress. ,,7
Transportation
Merchandise
Two laws were in place by the end of the 18th century
that served to encourage the growth of the coastal fleet,
especially on the local level. The first was the previously
mentioned 1789 discriminatory tonnage tax law under which
the domestic fleet more than tripled from 1789 to 1800. The
rationale for a discriminatory tax has been variously
ascribed to a retaliation against the British for closing
their trades to U.S. ships, and an early effort to promote
the U.S. maritime industry.8
The second law was the 1793 Act, part of which imposed
greater regulatory burdens on coastwise vessels operating on
longer voyages -- that is, voyages which were not to or from
ports in the same or adjacent states -- in that the masters
of these ships had to submit manifests or reports to the
local collector detailing the nature of the cargo, and
additionally were required to. obtain a permit for the
voyage. 9 Therefore, voyages between ports in the same or
adjacent states were encouraged by virtue of the fact that
lesser regulatory burdens were imposed upon these sailings.
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Although the intent of the law is difficult to discern, a
letter to the Senate from the Secretary of the Treasury in
1819 indicated that the distinction was probably created to
encourage trade on the regional level and to safeguard
against smuggling. lO
Exclusion of Foreign Shipping
An 1817 act barred the participation of foreign ships
in the coastwise trade, an exclusion that has remained in
effect since. Ships "belonging wholly or in part to a
subject of any foreign power" could not transport goods,
wares, or merchandise between ports of the United
States. ll The act prohibited both foreign-owned and
foreign-flag ships from the coastwise trade, although these
ships could still sail between ports of the U.S. as long as
they did not transport goods between one port and another.
The 1817 Act was the strongest statement to that point
regarding the protection that was to be granted to the U.S.
merchant fleet. Although it theoretically prohibited a
foreign vessel from transporting any merchandise between
U.S. ports, foreign carriers were able to find loopholes in
the statute, and all further efforts in the 19th century
devoted to regulating the carriage of merchandise were aimed
at closing these loopholes.
The Act was interpreted by the Attorney General, in an
1843 opinion, to allow the coastwise transportation of
domestic goods in foreign vessels, as long as the vessels
were wholly owned by U.S. citizens and paid the appropriate
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duties. 12 The Act may have been misinterpreted by the
Attorney General, who assumed that only foreign-owned ships
were prohibited from coastwise operation. However, the law
specifically barred foreign vessels -- meaning foreign-flag
vessels -- from domestic operation as well.
The 1817 Act was amended in 1893 by adding wording to
the effect that carrying merchandise in a foreign ship "via
any foreign port" was also illegal under the principle of
cabotage. 13 This language was in response to the practice
of shipping cargo via a foreign port on foreign ships in
order to save freight costs. In fact, impetus for the
passage of the 1893 amendment was the shipment of a cargo of
nails from New York to Antwerp on one foreign vessel and
then reshipment on another vessel to California. In U.S. v.
250 Kegs of Nails (1894), a circuit court ruled that the
1817 cabotage law did not prohibit this type of activity,
even though California was the intended destination of the
cargo. 14 Although the case was decided after the 1893
amendment became law, the actual shipment occurred prior to
that time.
An 1898 provision further tightened existing cabotage
law by adding language that prohibited the transport of
merchandise between ports of the United States in a foreign
vessel "for any part of the voyage. ,,15 This again
attempted to mitigate the practice.of shipping cargo for
part of a voyage to a foreign port and reshipping the cargo,
using a foreign vessel for one leg of the journey, and an
American vessel for the other part, so that "part of the
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voyage" would be on a foreign ship. 16 This creative method
of avoiding the cabotage requirements was especially
prevalent in the U.S. mainland to Alaska trade, where an
American ship would make the 90 mile journey to Vancouver,
drop off its cargo, and a less costly Canadian ship would
carry the cargo the remaining 1000 miles to Alaska. 17
The Jones Act
Most of the activities considered to be coastwise trade
had come under federal regulation by the turn of the
century. The laws essentially reserved the right to engage
in specific types of commerce to ships of the United States
and, since ships of the United States had to be built in the
United States whether they were engaged in the coastwise
trade or foreign trade, no distinction was made in the law
between country of registry and country of build. In other
words, prior to the Panama Canal Act of 1912, simply
requiring a ship to be U.S.-flag ensured that it would be
U.S.-built, so that no individual coastwise statute
explicitly mandated domestic construction of ships to be
used in the coastwise trade. 18
The Jones Act, usually considered to be the cornerstone
of the cabotage laws, did little other than restate the
existing protective policy of the 1817 Act, as amended in
1893 and 1898. 19 The Act did, howeve~, make some
important changes. First, it specifically mandated U.S.
construction of ships transporting merchandise, probably as
a reaction to the 1912 Panama Canal Act which had permitted
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foreign construction for ships in the foreign trade. As
stated in chapter 1, there was considerable nervousness that
the foreign-build policy would find its way to the domestic
trades, and so the language in the Jones Act was a reaction
to that.
A second change from prior cabotage law was the
requirement that merchandise transported "by land and water"
had to be moved on American ships during the water portion.
The purpose of this change was to preclude the "cargo
diversion" practice of shipping cargo overland to a Canadian
port and then by water to Alaska on foreign vessels. 20
In a broader context, the 1920 Merchant Marine Act for
the first time explicitly set forth the role of the merchant
marine as an auxiliary in wartime and emergencies. The Act
stated that the U.S. "shall" have a merchant marine which is
capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary.21
In addition, an attempt was made to apply the same
regime to passenger carriage as was applied to merchandise
carriage, although that effort ran into resistance in the
Senate. The House bill enacted as the Jones Act (H.R.
10378) was amended by the Senate Committee on Commerce such
that it would have been illegal for any passenger to
arrange through transportation between any two U.S. points
when any part of the transportation was on a foreign ship,
even if the passenger left the country ~o board the
Ship.22
The passenger portion of the bill was aimed at stopping
the practice of passenger travel to Alaska via Vancouver on
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board Canadian ships, although nothing in the bill
prohibited the purchase of a one way ticket from, for
example, Houston to Vancouver, and another one way ticket
from Vancouver to Alaska with Canadian ships providing all
the water transportation. It was simply the thrQu~h
transpQrtation that the bill affected. The specific
Qbjective was tQ stop Canadian passenger ship cQmpanies frQm
selling bQth Qf these tickets in a U.S. pQrt. SenatQr
Wesley JQnes, the chief prQponent Qf the measure, realized
that it was impQssible tQ stop them frQm selling a ticket in
Seattle fQr a vQyage tQ Vancouver, and then anQther ticket
in VancQuver fQr the remainder Qf the vQyage tQ Alaska. 23
The Senate, hQwever, clearly had CQncerns that such a
prQvisiQn WQuld unduly restrict the chQice Qf travelers, and
SQ it was stricken frQm the bill. 24 TherefQre, a balance
Qf sQrts had been struck between those interested in
preserving the freedQm Qf choice in passenger travel and
thQse interested in increasing the prQtectiQn accQrded the
U.S. merchant marine in the dQmestic carriage Qf passengers.
CQnsequently, passage Qf the JQnes Act did not affect the
transpQrt of passengers between American pQrts and the
Passenger Ship Act of 1886, as amended, which Qutlawed the
use Qf fQreign ships fQr the cQastwise carriage Qf
passengers, cQntinued tQ be the cQntrQlling law.
Passage Qf SenatQr JQnes' prQvisiQn would have had
interesting cQnsequences fQr the cruise ship fleet presently
Qperating frQm VanCQuver in that travel agents WQuld be
barred frQm SQme current QperatiQns. FQr example, purchase
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of a through ticket for a flight from a U.S. point to
Seattle followed by a bus trip to Vancouver and a one way
voyage on a Canadian ship to Alaska would have been
prohibited.
Although the Jones Act contains a ban on the
transshipment of cargo by foreign vessels -- the shipment
between U.S. points via a foreign point -- a problem with
administering the law has emerged recently with respect to
transshipped cargo. In American Maritime Association v.
Blumenthal, an oil company shipped Alaskan oil to the Virgin
Islands, where it was refined, and then on to east coast
ports, with both legs of the voyage on foreign Ships.25
The courts traditionally have applied an "intent test" in
determining whether a coastwise viqlation occurred, so that
if a shipper's intended destination was the United States, a
coastwise violation would occur when a foreign ship is used
on any leg of the voyage. 26 However, in American Maritime
Association v. Blumenthal, both the district and circuit
courts found that a Jones Act violation had not taken place,
because sufficient alteration had occurred in the refinery
process. The "alteration test" used in this case ignores
whether the U.S. was the intended destination of the
shipment. The implication is that foreign ships could be
used to transport raw materials from the U.S. to
manufacturing or refining plants outside the scope of U.S.
Cabotage law. Likewise, the finished product could be
reshipped to the U.S. on foreign vessels, all of which would
work to the detriment of.U.S. coastwise shipping. 27
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Due to various pressures from shipbuilding and
shipowning interests, the Jones Act has had a series of
provisos attached to it since its enactment which have both
strengthened and weakened the main body of the Act. These
provisos will be outlined in Chapter Five.
Passen~ers
The carriage of passengers was not addressed in the
1817 Act, probably because they were usually carried on the
same ships that carried cargo, rather than dedicated
passenger ships. While the legal framework governing
passenger carriage has remained essentially static since
1886, the changes in the industry have been dramatic.
Passenger ships have evolved from being the only means of
long distance transportation to being a destination in
themselves, primarily for leisure purposes. Therefore,
while the present law was created to assure U.S.-flag
presence in the coastwise transportation market, the
passenger ship industry is no longer concerned with
transportation and in fact is able to sidestep the U.S.-flag
requirement by providing a roundtrip service to and from the
same port. This service is in line with the evolution of
passenger vessels into cruise ships. which are essentially
floating resorts, rather than liner ships. which shuttle
passengers between ports. Because of the lower .costs of
using foreign-flag ships, the result has been the virtual
extinction of the U.S.-flag passenger fleet.
It is commonly assumed that passenger transportation
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was first reserved to American ships by the 1886 Passenger
Ship Act, although this is not quite true. Somewhat by
accident, perhaps, as early as 1838, steamships carrying
passengers had to have been U.S.-built and -owned. By a law
passed that year, all steam-propelled vessels had to take
out a new enrollment and license. 28 It further provided
that steamships could not transport goods, wares,
merchandise or passengers in or upon the lakes, bays, rivers
or other navigable waters of the United States without first
obtaining a license. 29 Newspaper accounts of the time
reveal that there were at least two serious accidents on
steamboats in June of 1838 that resulted in heavy loss of
life. The steamboat Washin~ton caught fire on a passage
from Cleveland to Detroit on June 16, 1838, with the loss of
as many as 40 people. 30 Another accident occurred on June
14, 1838, when a boiler on the steamer Pulaski exploded off
Wilmington, North Carolina, destroying the ship and
resulting in about 140 deaths. 31
It was clear therefore, that the 1838 law was
essentially a passenger safety law that was enacted in
response to an explosion on board a steamship, and that the
measure was more of a reaction to the need for safe
steamships than the need for domestically constructed and
owned steamships in the coastwise trade. At any rate,
perhaps inadvertently, the measure reserved the coa.stwise
transport of passengers for U.S.-built and owned steam
vessels until it was superceded by the Passenger Ship Act of
June 19, 1886.
-51-
Another law enacted 10 years later seemed to suggest
that Congress considered the carriage of passengers between
U.S. ports to be coastwise trade. regardless of the type of
ship. The 1848 law allowed vessels " ... duly registered in
pursuance of the laws of the United States ... " to carry
merchandise. passengers and their baggage. letters. and
mails between ports of the U.S. with intermediate stops at
foreign ports. 32 The only apparent analysis of the issue
is a one sentence entry in the Con~ressional Globe at the
time the bill was reported to the Senate which states that:
"This bill allows the steam packets between
New York and New Orleans to stop at Havana and
take in passengers. mails. etc .. provided that
no merchandise be landed or taken in. 1133
However. the law as enacted does allow the transport of
merchandise as well as passengers and it is unclear why the
report includes a proviso excluding the carriage of
merchandise. In any event, if the intent was to allow
coastwise-qualified vessels (that is. vessels enrolled and
licensed to engage in the coastwise trade) to make stops at
foreign ports. then it must be assumed that the carriage of
passengers was perceived by Congress to be an element of
coastwise commerce. including those passengers carried on
sailing ships.
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Passenger Ship Act of 1886
The Passenger Ship Act of 1886 signalled the growing
recognition of passenger-carrying ships as important
transportation modes and indicated the perceived need to
regulate them separately from ships carrying merchandise.
The provision states that foreign vessels found transporting
passengers between ports or places of the United States were
subject to a fine of $2 per passenger landed. 34 It was
felt by certain members of Congress that a penalty for
passenger carriage by foreign ships was a necessary
component of coastwise law, in addition to the penalty
provided for the illegal shipment of merchandise. 35
The $2 penalty was increased in 1898 to $200 per
passenger. 36 The lower penalty was seen as inadequate to
preserve to U.S. ships the Pacific Coast to Alaska passenger
trade, since it could be added to the price of a ticket with
little difficulty.37 It also provided that a foreign
vessel could not transport passengers "directly or by way of
a foreign port" between two u.S. ports or places. This was
done to avoid the practice of sailing from, for example,
Seattle to Vancouver on an American vessel and from
Vancouver to Alaska on a foreign vessel.
It is the feeling of many observers that the Passenger
Ship Act, by explicitly stipulating what type of ship could
carry passengers between U.S. ports, implicitly included
passenger transportation within the purview of coastwise
trade. On the other hand, the argument could be made that
the Passenger Ship Act was passed merely to put teeth into
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what was felt to be a pre-existing policy by creating the
two dollar per passenger penalty. At any rate, the regime
for participation in the passenger-carrying trades was
clearly and unequivocally defined by the 1886 Passenger Ship
Act.
Court and Administrative Policy
Passenger transportation, almost without exception, was
seen by the courts and agencies to be part of the coastwise
trade after enactment of the Passenger Ship Act. The thrust
of these decisions has generally been twofold. First, they
recognized that Congress has the right to regulate the
coastwise trade, and second that passenger carriage is part
of the coastwise trade. The lack of congressional action in
the face of the changing nature of the passenger Ship
industry has meant that judicial and administrative
decisions have been the primary means of policy formulation.
Early Judicial Policy Toward Passenger Carriage
While passenger carriage on steamships was statutorily
included within the realm of coastwise law in 1838, the
courts seemed to reach that conclusion as early as 1824,
when it was held that:
"Commerce is not prevented because the object
of it is to serve the pleasure of .passengers.
The business was that of earning money by
transporting people on the navigable waters of
.the United States and, strictly speaking, it is
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just as much a part of commerce
vessels were carrying cargoes of
merchandise. ,,38
as if these
However, early court cases and executive decisions
reached differing opinions on the applicability of the
coastwise trade laws to vessels carrying passengers. In
Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court held that the coasting
trade applies equally to the transportation of passengers
and merchandise. 39 In fact, it was noted that there was
no provision in existing passenger-related law which
governed what type of ship could carry passengers. 40 The
court 'construed this to mean that Congress had felt that
existing regulations covered passenger vessel movement in
the coastwise trade and that no additional regulation was
necessary. 41
In a sUbsequent case before the Supreme Court (City of
New York v. Miln) , it was held to be improper to consider
shipboard passengers as the subject of commerce and,
therefore, the power given to Congress by the Constitution
to regulate commerce did not override certain police powers
possessed by states to regulate immigrant passengers. 42
However, the opinion of the court did not question the power
of Congress to regulate passengers while they were on their
yoya~e and, in fact, reaffirmed that power. In short, the
court seemed to reinforce the Congressional prerogative to
regulate the coastwise carriage of passengers. On the other
hand, the court did hold that the internal police power of a
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state enabled it to regulate passengers once they had
landed. 43
The holding in City of New York v. Miln was
misconstrued, however, in an Attorney General's opinion of
November 2, 1843. The Attorney General ruled that
foreign-built, foreign-owned vessels could transport
passengers between ports of the United States. He construed
the 1817 Act, which stated that "no goods, wares or
merchandise shall be imported .,. from one port of the
United States to another port of the United States, in a
vessel belonging wholly or in part to a subject of any
foreign power," as not applying to passengers. 44 In
support, the Attorney General cited City of New York v.
Miln, where the court held that persons or passengers were
not the sUbject of commerce, and therefore did not fall
within the realm of Congress's power to regulate commerce.
He also cited (evidently unaware of the 1838 steamship law)
the total lack of any federal legislation regarding the
coastwise transport of passengers, except for the Act of
March 12, 1812 regarding inland steamboats, and stated his
opinion -- correctly, as far as sailing ships were concerned
-- that foreign vessels could legally carry passengers
between the ports of the United States. 45 .Apparently, this
was not perceived as a problem, for no legislation
concerning the coastwise carriage of passengers -- aside
from the steamship law of 1838 -- was enacted until
1886. 46
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Court and Administrative Policy After the Passenger Ship
Act of 1886
The Passenger Ship Act of 1886 set in concrete the
notion that passenger carriage was coastwise commerce. No
executive or judicial decision after enactment of that law
questioned that premise. For example. in Ravesies v. U.S.
(1888). it was held that interstate commerce includes the
transportation of objects of trade and commerce as well as
the transportation of passengers. 47 Moreover. a 1939
Kentucky State Sourt of Appeals case also upheld the
inclusion of passenger transportation -- even if it was to
and from the same port -- in the meaning of coastwise trade:
"Coasting trade embraces commercial intercourse
between places in the same district or state on
a navigable river That the object may be to
serve the pleasure of passengers and the
journey from and to the same port would seem to
make no difference in the classification. ,,48
Despite this ruling. the Customs Service has not
included trips to and from the same port within the
protection of the coastwise laws.
A 1940 District Court case used the concept of the
purpose of the voyage to determine whether a violation of
coastwise law had occurred. 49 This concept had been used
in earlier Customs rulings. upon which the courts have
traditionally drawn heavily. The case involved a Honduran
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ship employed in the banana trade between New York and
Central America that regularly carried a limited number of
passengers on a round trip voyage from New York to Mexico.
In the particular instance, the ship put in at Philadelphia
on the return voyage to get the bananas ashore in a saleable
condition. The passengers were let off in Philadelphia and
given railroad fare back to New York. Judge Bard examined
the various Attorney General rUlings and distinguished
between the carriage of passengers locally (Boston to
Philadelphia, for example), and on world cruises. The
Attorney General opinion of February 26, 1910 (the Cleveland
case) was cited as support that the test should be the
object of the transportation:
"If one should take passage on a vessel at New
York for Liverpool, and after transacting
business in that city should again take
passage on the same vessel on its return
voyage and be landed in Boston, it certainly
would not be insisted that the vessel would be
subject to the penalty imposed by the
statute. ,,50
JUdge Bard ruled in the Granada case that the object of
the transportation in question was a cruise to a foreign
port and not coastwise commerce between U.S. ports. This
rUling reinforced Customs' earlier Cleveland opinion which
allowed the transport of passengers between U.S. ports on
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foreign vessels as long as a "non-nearby" foreign port is
visited. 51 The notion of intent. or purpose of the voyage
was thereby tied to the geographic distance the ship
traveled between the two coastwise ports. This concept is
still used by Customs in the setting of its regulations, as
will be seen below.
Administrative Interpretations
Executive agencies have issued a number of rUlings on
the application of the Passenger Ship Act of 1886. In
general, these have focused on the continuity of the voyage
and whether the intended purpose or objective of the trip
was coastwise transportation. In other words, the Act was
held violated if the coastwise movement was continuous or if
the purpose of the trip was a coastwise voyage.
Possibly the earliest interpretation of the Passenger
Ship Act was an Attorney General opinion of September 4,
1886. 52 This opinion concerned a foreign vessel which
picked up passengers in Cleveland, took them to the port of
Windsor in Canada, and then transported them to Chicago.
The Attorney General ruled this a violation of the Passenger
Ship Act since the voyage was "a substantially continuous
one" aboard a foreign vessel between ports of the United
States. 53 The Attorney General did not rule out the option
of the passengers transferring to a different foreign Ship
at the foreign port in order to avoid the two dollar per
passenger fine under the Passenger Ship Act.
The Attorney General ruled in a February 26, 1910
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opinion that tourists who were taken aboard the German
steamer Cleveland in New York for a world cruise and landed
in San Francisco were not transported in violation of the
Passenger Ship Act. 54 The rationale used by the Attorney
General was that since several ports around the world were
visited and the purpose of the trip was not strictly
transportation between New York and San Francisco, the
cruise did not violate the spirit of the Act.
This rUling is still used by the Customs Service in
regulating the coastwise passenger trade. It is currently
permissible according to Customs regulations to transport
passengers from one port of the United States to another
port of the United States on a foreign vessel if a far-away
foreign port is visited enroute. 55 Customs has defined
far-away foreign ports as all ports other than those in
North and Central America (except for some ports in the
Leeward Islands, which are considered far-away ports).
In response to Canadian vessels which were making trips
to Canadian waters on the Great Lakes from an American port,
and then returning to that port, the Attorney General ruled
on February 12, 1912 that transporting passengers to and
from the same U.S. port on a foreign vessel did not violate
the Passenger Ship Act of 1886. 56 The Act states merely
that a foreign vessel may not transport passengers between
one port of the United States and another, and does not
address the issue of "round-trips" from the same port.
This ruling is also used by the Customs Service in
setting its current regulations. As stated earlier, there
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are several foreign-flag cruise ships operating cruises to
nowhere from U.S. ports, notably Miami, without objection,
because Customs does not consider this activity to be
coastwise trade. No doubt the authors of the original 1886
law dealing with passenger vessels would have shivered with
fright at the spectre of spending vacation time aboard a
ship, and so did not conceive that it would become a popular
pastime. Whether they would have intended that this type of
activity should be classified as "coastwise trade," and
therefore the ships involved be subjected to the stringent
U.S.-building and documentation requirement is an
interesting question. 57
The Attorney General issued another ruling on February
1, 1913 in a case that was similar to the Cleveland
case. 58 A foreign steamship line was found to be in
violation of the Passenger Ship Act by transporting
passengers between New York and Puerto Rico, where the
primary object of the voyage was found to be the transport
between ports of the U.S. and the secondary object of the
voyage was sightseeing to various other islands. This case
was distinguished from the Cleveland case because in the
latter, the voyage to foreign ports for sightseeing purposes
was found to be the sole purpose of the trip, and transport
between New York and San Francisco was merely
incidental. 59
A further ruling was handed down on December 24,
1924. 60 In this instance, the transport of a group from
Philadelphia to Boston, where the group attended a
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convention, and then a return voyage via two Canadian ports
to Philadelphia, all on a foreign Ship, was found to be a
violation of the Passenger Ship Act. The central finding
here was that the primary object of the voyage was the
attendance at a convention in Boston. Without that
convention, the voyage would not have been undertaken. The
significance of these two rulings is apparent in that
Customs deems there to be a violation of the Passenger Ship
Act whenever the purpose of the voyage is seen to be
coastwise transportation, regardless of the number of
foreign ports visited enroute.
A 1930 ruling further defined the application of the
Passenger Ship Act to an evolving ocean transportation
industry.61 In this case, passengers purchased through
tickets from San Francisco to Sydney, Australia from a
Japanese steamship line. A Japanese ship carried the
passengers from San Francisco to Honolulu, and a Ship of the
Canadian-Australasian Line transported them from Honolulu to
Sydney. Attorney General Thacher in this case referred to
the September 4, 1886 opinion where it was declared that any
time a foreign vessel transports passengers, on a
SUbstantially continuous yoya~e. between ports of the United
States, there is a violation of the Passenger Ship Act. 62
The transportation of passengers between San Francisco and
Honolulu was held to be such a violation, regardless of the
intent or final destination of the passengers.
The Customs Service has used these rulings and court
cases to fashion its policy toward the coastwise carriage of
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passengers. Specifically, it considers a violation of the
1886 Passenger Ship Act to have taken place when passengers
are carried between U.S. ports, whether directly or not,
when that is the intended purpose of the voyage.
Recreational Vessels
As mentioned earlier, an important component of the
modern cruise trade are "cruises to nowhere." In addition to
the well known "Love Boat" type of cruise, there are several
other varieties of what might be termed "passenger service"
cruises which begin and end in the same port. For example,
scuba diving trips and charter fishing trips are common in
U.S. ports. Interestingly, the Customs Service regards
these voyages differently for the purposes of the coastwise
trade laws. If a scuba diving boat takes passengers outside
the three mile territorial sea, to and from the same port,
the voyage is not considered coastwise trade and could be
performed by a foreign-flagged vessel. However, a charter
fishing vessel performing the same voyage would be engaging
in the coastwise trade, even if it went outside the
territorial sea. 63 Once the fishing lines go over the
side, Customs holds the voyage of a charter fishing boat to
be coastwise trade in nature, despite the obvious
similarities to other "passenger service" voyages.
Yachts
In a Court of Appeals case in 1970, the time chartering
of a yacht for pleasure purposes was held to be a coastwise
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trade activity.54 A time charter occurs when a vessel
owner charters, or leases, a ship to to another party for a
specified period of time, usually with the owner retaining
effective control over the ship through the master. The
same arrangement made for a specified voyage would be a
voyage charter. A bareboat or demise charter is one in
which the charterer assumes full responsibility for the
vessel's operation. In the case of a yacht, a time
chartered vessel normally has a captain and crew provided by
the owner and so the charterers are considered passengers.
On the other hand, the charterers of a bareboat yacht are
considered the owners pro hac vice. and therefore are not
considered passengers. 55
The implications for the coastwise operation of yachts,
which can be used for both transportation and recreation,
are that time chartered yachts must be coastwise-qualified,
since they carry passengers for hire. Conversely, bareboat
chartered yachts need not be coastwise-qualified, as long as
no control or management over the yacht is exercised by the
owner. 55 At any rate, if the yacht is not used for
transporting passengers between coastwise points, it need
not be coastwise-qualified, regardless of the charter
arrangment. That is, if the boat remains tied to the dock,
it need not be U.S.-flag and U.S.-built.
Current Regulatory Arrangement
Combining the Passenger Ship Act of 1885 with its
numerous rUlings, the Customs Service has established a
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three-tiered regulatory system governing the movement of
foreign passenger ships between U.S. ports. In the first
tier, a foreign vessel moving passengers between U.S. ports
without any intervening stops is in violation of the
Passenger Ship Act if a passenger steps ashore at the second
port even temporarily.67
In the second tier, if a foreign vessel touches a
nearby foreign port between the U.S. ports, the passengers
may go ashore while the vessel is in the second U.S.
coastwise port. If the passenger does not reboard the ship
before it leaves. there is a violation of the Passenger Ship
Act. 68 Originally, this tier also provided that a foreign
passenger ship that had visited a nearby foreign port
between two U.S. ports could stay only 24 hours in the
second U.S. port before passengers had to be back aboard and
the ship underway. Citing the lack of a statutory time
constraint in the Passenger Ship Act and the economic
benefit to ports in Alaska, Florida, and Puerto Rico, The
Customs Service amended its regulations on July 31, 1985 so
that the 24 hour time constraint was abOlished. 69
Understandably, there was a great deal of support for the
change among political and private interests in Alaska,
Puerto Rico, and the West Coast states. Eradicating the 24
hour rule was viewed as a tremendous boost to the local
economies, since passengers would potentially be ashore for
longer periods of time.
In the third tier, a foreign passenger vessel may
discharge passengers permanently at a second U.S. port if a
-65-
non-nearby foreign port is visited first. 70 However, if
coastwise transportation is the primary object, or purpose,
of the voyage in any of these three cases, a violation of
the Passenger Ship Act will have occurred. Customs deems
the purpose of a voyage as coastwise if one of two
situations occurs. If the number of U.S. ports visited
exceeds the number of foreign ports visited ~ if the amount
of time spent in U.S. ports exceeds the amount of time spent
in foreign ports, then the purpose of the voyage is held to
be coastwise transportation. 71
Dred~e Spoil and Waste
The transportation of dredge spoil and waste have only
become an issue relatively recently.72 Customs considers
the transportation of dredge spoil and waste to be coastwise
trade when the material has any value whatsoever, and is
thereby equivalent to merchandise. Material which "has no
apparent value and will not be used commercially or in trade
but is being dumped as worthless" is not considered to be
merchandise by the agency.73 Therefore, if the material
is dumped at sea or otherwise disposed of as useless, the
transportation would not be considered coastwise trade. On
the other hand, if the same material was used as landfill,
for example, it would have value, and the transportation of
that material would be coastwise trade. 74 The
significance of this is that vessels transporting valueless
waste need not be coastwise-qualified, whereas vessels
transporting waste that may be used as fill or for other
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purposes must be documented for the coastwise trade.
A movement of valuable dredge spoil which had
repercussions for oil and gas activities on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) was examined in a 1983 Customs
rUling. A proposal to use four Canadian-built bottom
dumping barges on the North Slope of Alaska for gravel
transport prompted the ruling. 75 The Customs Service held
that the transport of valuable spoil, such as gravel, is
considered to be coastwise trade when the movement is
between two coastwise points, and the material is
merchandise for the purpose of the Jones Act. 76 Therefore,
the vessels involved in the transportation had to be
coastwise-qualified.
In Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., v. Ludwig (Great
Lakes), the court held that the transport of valueless
dredge spoil solely for the purpose of disposing of it was
not considered as coastwise trade. 77 The case involved a
U.S.-built dredge that had been sold foreign and was
sUbsequently used to perform dredging activities on the
Cuyahoga River. The argument that the activity of dredging
valueless spoil was coastwise trade in nature was rejected
by the court as inconsistent with prior Customs rUlings,
upon which the court relied heavily in its decision. The
important point for this section was, as stated, that the
transport of the valueless spoil did not violate the
coastwise trade laws (specifically the Jones Act), since the
spoil was of no use _and therefore not a thing of value.
Had it come up, the court presumably would have held
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that the transport of any type of waste is not considered
coastwise trade. This, of course, has implications for the
vessels transporting the waste, such as garbage scows,
incinerator ships, and others. Barring any other federal
law, may they be foreign-built or even foreign-flag? As
outlined above, the Customs Service does not apply the
coastwise laws to the transport of valueless waste, and so
ships undertaking such operations need not be
coastWise-qualified.
The shipment of hazardous waste between the U.S. and
the open sea for incineration was covered by separate
legislation in 1982 which deemed that activity to be
coastwise trade. 78 Presumably, the waste being
incinerated has no value, except as a means of earning money
for the owner of the incinerator ship. Judging by agency
and court holdings, the transport of this material should
not be SUbject to the cabotage laws, since it is valueless.
In enacting this specific legislation, however, which
states that ocean incineration vessels operating between the
U.S. and open water are operating in the coastwise trade,
Congress may have perceived a need to exclude foreign ships
because of the detrimental impact on the u.S. fleet.
Dredgin~
In 1906, the type of dredge that could be operated in
the United States was addressed through specific
legislation, largely as a result of the protest surrounding
the use of four foreign dredges that assisted in the
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rebuilding of Galveston after the hurricane of September 8,
1900. 79 In response to questions of the legality of the
project, proponents for the use of foreign-built dredges at
Galveston did not argue that the activity of dredging was
not coastwise trade in nature, but that the existing
cabotage law at the time eR.S. 4347, the Act of February 17,
1898) only prohibited the movement of merchandise between
ports of the U.S., an activity which the dredges would not
undertake. 80
It is important to remember that dredging is
distinguished from the transport of the dredge spoil, and
since the former operation was not off-limits to foreign
equipment, Galveston was in fact rebuilt by the foreign
dredges. Needless to say, certain maritime interests felt
threatened by this turn of events, and they did not hesitate
to let the Congress know. The 1906 dredging law that was
enacted prohibited the use of foreign-built dredges unless
they were documented as U.S. vessels and further directed
the Commissioner of Navigation to document as U.S. vessels
five foreign built dredges. 81
While the second section mandating documentation of the
five foreign dredges was deleted as obsolete. the wording of
the first section, perhaps inadvertantly. was not reshaped
to reflect this change. In other words. the language
barring the use of a foreign-built dredge "unless documented
as a vessel of the United States" remains intact. so that as
it is worded, the law would seem to allow the use of:
1. A U.S.-built, U.S.-flag dredge;
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2. A U.S.-built, foreign-flag dredge;
3. A foreign-built, U.S.-flag dredge.
Did the Congress intend that any foreign-built dredge
that procures a U.S. document could engage in dredging in
the U.S., or was this language intended to apply only to the
five foreign dredges mentioned above?82 According to the
Coast Guard, the proviso applied only to the five foreign
dredges, so that a foreign-built dredge in existence today
can not obtain a registry and begin dredging. 83 Clearly,
there is a contradiction between the wording of the statute
and the relevant Coast Guard regulations. Despite the fact
that a foreign-built dredge can legally obtain a registry,
and despite the 1906 dredging law, which purportedly allows
a foreign-built, U.S.-documented dredge to undertake
dredging in the U.S., the Coast Guard will not give such a
dredge the authority to operate. 84
The contradiction is explained by the legislative
history of the dredging law, according to the Coast Guard.
The agency maintains that the intent of the Congress was to
allow the documentation of only the five foreign-built
dredges mentioned in section 2 of the original law. 85
The Customs Service, for its part, does not consider
dredging to be a coastwise activity. Therefore, a dredge
need not possess a coastwise license in order to operate in
U.S. waters. 86 However, Customs does. require the dredge to
be U.S.-built in all cases. In a ruling issued August 6,
1984, the agency held that a foreign-built, U.S.-documented
dredge could not engage in dredging in the United States,
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citing section 2 above and legislative intent in enacting
the 1906 law. 87 On the other hand, according to the
rUling, a U.S.-built, forei~n-flag dredge is entitled to
dredge in the U.S., because the 1906 law forbids dredging
only by foreign-built vessels. 88 As stated earlier,
because of the fact that a dredge may be foreign-flag, a
Coast Guard document is not required of a dredge working in
the United States, so that domestic ownership, crewing, flag
and other requirements do not apply. Therefore, both the
Coast Guard and Customs Service exclude dredging from the
activity of coastwise trade.
The same is not true of the Justice Department,
however. An opinion of the Attorney General in 1963 held
that dredging was a coastwise trade activity, and that the
dredging statute was a coastwise act. 89 The implication is
that under this interpretation, a dredge would have to be
coastwise-qualified. In addition to being U.S. built, it
would have to have a coastwise license and be U.S. owned and
manned.
In Great Lakes, a 1980 case involving the use of a non
coastwise-qualified dredge to do contract work in the
Cuyahoga River, the district court held that the Customs
Service had properly ruled that the dredging of valueless
spoil does not constitute coastwise trade. 90 The dredge in
this case was built in the U.S. and had at one point been
sold foreign, although at the time of its employment on the
Cuyahoga River, it was owned by a U.S. company. For the
purposes of the documentation statutes, not all dredging
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constitutes coastwise trade and. in fact. American-built
dredges should be able to engage in dredging in the U.S.
without being licensed and enrolled for the coastwise trade.
as lon~ as they are documented in some form, according to
the court's opinion. 91
Moreover, the court stated that foreign-built dredges
would have to be registered rather than enrolled since there
are prohibitions to the use of foreign-built equipment in
the coastwise trade, although that was beyond the scope of
the case. Clearly, the court took the wording of the
dredging statute seriously to mean that if a foreign-built-
dredge is documented in the U.S., it may engage in
dredging. 92
Dredging, therefore. in itself is not considered to be
a coastwise trade activity, although participation in that
activity is regUlated by the federal government. The
dredging industry is protected in a way, because only
U.S.-built dredges may participate. Clearly this is less
protection than is afforded to ships carrying merchandise,
but it is an indication that U.S. policy-makers have viewed
the dredging industry as worthy of protection in its own
right.
TQwing
This activity was first regulated by a federal statute
in 1866 which barred foreign tugs from towing U.S. vessels
between U.S. ports. 93 This law did not last long as it
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was originally enacted, but was amended in February of the
following year to include two provisos. 94 The first
allows foreign tugs to tow U.S. documented ships between
U.S.ports if any of the tow was through foreign waters. The
term "foreign waters" was not further defined. although
presumably this meant the territorial waters of a foreign
country. The second exempted tugs owned by foreign
railroads whose road entered the U.S. by means of a tug or
ferry.
The legislative history of these laws is scarce.
although barring foreign tugs from U.S. employment was
undoubtedly conceived to assure some degree of employment
for American tugs. The 1867 amendment was in response to
pressure from owners of tugs and vessels located on the
Great Lakes. because of the inflexibility of international
boundaries. and the fact that navigating realities made it
difficult to determine with certainty whether the vessel was
located in U.S. or Canadian waters. 95 The logic of this
argument is somewhat puzzling. since the original statute
had no bearing on boundaries. It may be that Canadian tug
owners were objecting to the situation where they could be
held liable for towing an American vessel to a U.S. port
from the territorial waters of the United States.
The second proviso. allowing foreign railroads to own
tugs and operate them as if they were U.S. owned. was
probably included to allow Canadian tugs to pUll railroad
ferries to more than one U.S. port from Canada.
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The 1940 TQwin~ Law
The towing statute of 1866, as amended, was felt by
many to be inadequate by the 1930s for at least two reasons.
First, it appeared that the penalties for its violation were
insufficient to discourage foreign tugboats to take jobs in
the U.S., especially the longer tows. Moreover. a foreign
tug could pick up a tow in a U.S. port, proceed to a foreign
port, drop anchor for a moment, then proceed to another U.S.
port without violating the law. Although technically two
foreign voyages, the result would be one coastwise
transportation. 96
A bill CH.R. 8533) was introduced on November 25, 1937
that attempted to remedy some of these problems. 97 Among
other things, the legislation specifically prohibited any
foreign ship from towing between ports of the U.S. " ... or
to do any part of such towing. 1198 The same section of the
bill provided that both the owner and the master would be
liable for a penalty of $250 for any violation of the
statute. However, both the administration and industry
groups felt that a $250 penalty was insufficient. 99 The
Department of Commerce expressed the view that the $250
penalty might not be enough and suggested it be changed to
"not less than $250 nor more than $1000."100 At the same
time, two industry representatives recommended that the
existing penalty of fifty cents per. ton be changed to fifty
dollars per ton. 101 The perception among the American
towing industry was that neither the fifty cents per ton nor
the proposed $250 penalties were SUfficient to discourage
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foreign companies from taking American towing jobs. An
example was cited repeatedly of a tow made from New Orleans
to Seattle for $35,000 from which the proposed and existing
penalties would not detract significantly.l02
Another effect of the bill was that it did not include
the term "steam tug-boats" as in the 1866 statute. The bill
further tightened the existing requirements by stipulating
that a tug had to be U.S.-owned and had to have a
certificate of registry, an enrollment, a license, or a
motorboat number in order to engage in towing. These
changes were eventually enacted and they served to put
towing on the same playing field as ships involved in
transportation, except that domestic vessel construction was
stipulated. An exemption was provided for foreign tugboats
that were towing forei~n vessels between U.S. ports,
although it is unclear Why this was included. In
particular, the Foss Company reacted strongly to this
provision, and requested that it be deleted from the
measure, stating that it doubted it was the actual intent to
allow a foreign tug to tow a foreign vessel between, for
example, Boston and New York. 103
One further issue raised with the bill as introduced
was section (c), which prohibited foreign-owned tugs and
ferries used in conjunction with a railroad entering the
country by means of that tug or ferry from participating in
the transport of merchandise between one U.S. point and
another. 104 The problem with this provision was that an
amendment to the Jones Act three,years earlier allowed the
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transport of merchandise on non Jones Act-qualified railroad
ferries operating between the U.S. and Canada under some
circumstances. Cargo movement from the U.S. to Canada and
back to the U.S. by means of these ferries were affected by
the legislation. 105 The proposed legislation would have
taken away the exemption to the Jones Act conferred by the
three year old amendment. The objectors succeeded in having
language inserted in later bills that continued the
exemption provided in the Jones Act.
The bill was reintroduced in the next Congress on
January 3, 1939 as H.R. 200. Language regarding penalties
and the above mentioned Jones Act exemption was added that
addressed the concerns of industry groups. In addition, the
bill exempted vessels in distress from the towing
requirements and maintained the exemption for foreign tugs
towing foreign vessels. The "vessels in distress" exemption
was included because of the feeling on the part of the
Maritime Commission that "in case of emergency, there should
be no absolute prohibition against the use of any available
facilities for salvage purposes, including towing,
irrespective of its ownership or registry ... "106 The
towing portion of the bill had the support of most of the
industry and executive agencies that commented on it. l07
H.R. 200 was reintroduced as H.R. 8283, with only one
change to the towing portion. The.change was in section (a)
and it clarified the application of the term "citizen of the
United States," for the purposes of tugboat ownership in the
bill. l08 The bill was signed into law and superseded the
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1866 towing law on June 11, 1940.
Section (a) of the new towing law allowed any
U.S.-owned tug with a certificate of registry, an enrollment
or a license to engage in towing. An early question that
arose was whether a foreign-built tug with a registry could
be used to tow a vessel. It should be recalled that
foreign-built ships could be issued a registry under the
Panama Canal Act, as long as they did not engage in the
coastwise trade. The issue, therefore, was whether towing
was part of the coastwise trade. Customs ruled in 1958 that
such a vessel would be prohibited from towing between u.S.
ports. 109 The link between coastwise trade and towing was
strengthened in a further rUling in which Customs stated
that they considered towing to be coastwise trade, and
therefore a vessel needed a coastwise document, not just any
document. 110
Foreign Tugs in the Coastwise Trade
Despite the inclusion of towing within the purview of
coastwise trade, Customs does allow foreign-flag tugs to tow
U.S. barges if no merchandise is transported and the
movement is part of an overall foreign voyage. In 1954, the
agency held that a Canadian tug was allowed to tow an
American barge from Seattle to Canada via Tacoma when cargo
was laden at both U.S. ports. III However, in a
conflicting rUling issued in 1967, Customs found a violation
of the towing statute when the towing began and ended in
U.S. ports, regardless of whether the voyage was part of a
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continuous foreign voyage. 112 That policy was reversed in
1970 when it ruled that a foreign tug towing a U.S. barge
between U.S. ports is permitted when the movement is part
of a continuous foreign voyage. 113 The policy was further
clarified in a letter the same year that stated that the
towing statute must be construed in pari materia with other
coastwise trade laws, notably the Jones Act. 114 The Jones
Act allows the coastwise transport of merchandise in foreign
vessels as long as it is not laden in one U.S. port and
unladen in another. Customs' policy toward towing reflects
this statutory wording so that a foreign tug may tow an
American barge between U.S. ports if the transport is part
of an overall foreign movement and no merchandise is
transported coastwise.
Interestingly, in a 1966 internal memorandum from
Customs' chief counsel to the Commissioner, it was
maintained that the House Report on H.R. 8283 "points up
with sufficient clarity that it was intended to bar foreign
tugs from participating in any way in towing American
vessels on an overall voyage from one United States port to
another (emphasis added).ul15 Notwithstanding this
argument, the agency has continued to regard towing in a
manner consistent with the September 24, 1970 letter.
A further issue in the application of the towing law is
the ability of foreign tugs to provide docking services for
foreign ships in U.S. harbors. This activity is technically
legal. although surprisingly it has not surfaced as a
potential problem for U.S. towing companies until recently.
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Representatives of Foss Towing Company (ironically, the same
company that originally complained about the provision in a
letter in 1937 to the Chairman of the Merchant Marine &
Fisheries Committee) succeeded in having language inserted
in a miscellaneous Coast Guard bill in November, 1985, that
would end the right of foreign tugs to tow foreign vessels
between U.S. ports, so that a foreign tug could only tow a
vessel in distress. 116 The intent of this provision is to
mitigate the possibility of a foreign towboat providing
docking services in U.S. ports for foreign ships, and based
on Customs' past rUlings, the agency would still allow
foreign tugs to tow foreign barges in continuous foreign
voyages, assuming that no merchandise is transported
coastwise. The language in the Coast Guard bill also
stipulates that a qualified towing vessel must have a
coastwise license, which alleviates some of the confusion
surrounding the status of the vessel's document. 117
Salvage
Canadian vessels were first given the right to
undertake salvage operations in U.S. waters in 1878,
although the right was limited to U.S. waters contiguous to
Canada. 118 This measure gave Canadian ships the right to
engage in salvage work in U.S. waters "contiguous to the
Dominion of Canada" as long as reciprocal privileges were
extended to U.S. vessels. The area was not further defined
in the statute nor is it clear what originally prohibited
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Canadian ships from salvage operations in U.S. waters,
unless it was the perception that salvage was an activity
that required a license under the 1793 act, and therefore
only U.S. ships were qualified for the activity.
The salvage law was amended in 1890 to its present
form, without further elaborating on the area which was
considered to be "contiguous to the Dominion of
Canada."119 The only change made in 1890 was to apply the
provisions of the law to certain canals and rivers between
the U.S. and Canada.
The 1908 Treaty
For the purposes of salvage by Canadian vessels, the
1908 Treaty between the United States and Canada defined the
contiguous area in which Canadian vessels could operate
Witho~t penalty.120 By 1908, therefore, Canadian salvage
ships were permitted to operate in a specified area of U.S.
waters: namely, along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts
within 30 miles of the boundaries, and in commonly shared
Great Lakes waters "contiguous to the Dominion of Canada."
Ships of nations other than the United States and Canada
were not permitted to operate in the U.S. by this Treaty.
The 1940 Salvage Law
Salvage and towing often involve similar operations,
and consequently it was felt necessary to include language
in the towing bills of 1937 through 1940 to the effect that
the towing provisions were not intended to conflict with the
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salvage law of 1878, as amended. Whereas the 1878 law and
the Treaty of 1908 had outlined areas where foreign ships
could undertake salvaging in the U.S., the bills which were
introduced from 1937 to 1940 attempted to clarify the areas
off-limits to foreign ships. H.R. 8533, the first of the
bills, made it illegal for foreign ships to undertake
salvaging operations in Great Lakes areas outside that
portion covered by the 1908 Treaty. 121
The Administration had two problems with H.R. 8533, one
of which related to the area of applicability and the other
to the lack of a "safety valve," in case U.S. ships were
unavailable to assist a ship in distress. In the latter
case, the Maritime Commission argued that, as a coinsurer of
some vessels and owner of others, an absolute prohibition
against the use of foreign salvage equipment was undesirable
because U.S. equipment may not be available in some
cases. 122 It was noted that the Department of Commerce had
allowed the use of Canadian salvage equipment in U.S.
waters on several occasions for that reason, and the
Commission suggested a change permitting the Secretary of
Commerce to waive the salvage requirement if necessary. 123
The Commerce Department agreed that Canadian salvage vessels
ought to be allowed to operate farther than 30 miles from
the boundary, provided it was an emergency situation, no
U.S. equipment was available, and cargo from wrecks was not
transported to U.S. ports by foreign vessels. 124
The second administration concern related to the area
within which foreign ships would be excluded under H.R.
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8533. The bill barred foreign ships from any Great Lake or
tributary area which was not covered by the 1908 Treaty.
Since the Treaty applied to some portions of the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts in addition to the Great Lakes, the
Maritime Commission reasoned that H.R. 8533 ought to be
extended to bar foreign ships from all U.S. territorial
waters not covered by the Treaty. 125 This view was also
shared by the Department of Commerce, which opposed the
application of H.R. 8533 to just the Great Lakes. 126
H.R. 200, introduced in 1939, incorporated the change
regarding the area of applicability by extending the foreign
vessel prohibition to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the
United States. While the Maritime Commission and the
Department of Commerce were pleased with this, the State
Department objected on the grounds that it interfered with
our treaty obligations to Mexico under the Treaty of June
13, 1935, which provided a reciprocal arrangement whereby
ships of either the U.S. or Mexico could undertake salvage
efforts in the territorial waters of either nation within
200 miles of the Gulf of Mexico boundary and 720 miles of
the Pacific coast boundary. 127 The state Department noted
that H.R. 200 extended the foreign ship ban to the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts without mentioning the Mexican Treaty,
and it was suggested that the Treaty area be specifically
excluded from the bill's provisions. 128 Further, H.R. 200
did not contain a waiver provision, as requested earlier.
and both the Maritime Commission and the Department of
Commerce objected to it on these grounds.
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Steamship interests were allied with the administration
in support of a waiver provision in the salvage law when no
U.S. salvage company was available. 129 A case was cited
at the 1940 hearing where an American ship had grounded more
than 30 miles south of the Canadian border. Due to the
unavailability of U.S. salvage equipment and the time delay
in getting departmental permission for use of a Canadian
vessel, the grounded ship was a total 10ss.130
An amendment was suggested at the 1940 hearing which
incorporated both the waiver provision and reference to the
Mexican Treaty. 131 The language of the amendment
prohibited the use of foreign salvage vessels on the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the Gulf of Mexico, and in the
Great Lakes, except where our treaty obligations specified
otherwise and when the Secretary of Commerce found that no
suitable qualified U.S. vessel was available. 132 One
interesting change was made to the amendment language when
H.R. 200 was reintroduced as H.R. 8283. The change included
Alaska -- then a territory -- in the salvage portion of the
bill, in addition to the geographic areas mentioned
above. 133 However, the Alaska reference, for reasons that
are unclear, was stricken from H.R. 8283 in Committee markup
and~ change was agreed to on the floor of the House on
May 6, 1940. 134 The bill was sUbsequently signed into law
with the Alaska exclusion, so that Alaska was implicitly not
brought under the purview of the salvage law and presumably
a ship of any flag could perform salvage services there.
Customs stated its position on the applicability of the
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salvage statute in a March 8, 1985 letter. 135 Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands were held not to come under the law,
because they are not "places on the Atlantic coast within
the meaning of section 316(d).,,136 Notwithstanding that
Puerto Rico is considered to be a point embraced within the
coastwise laws, and salvage is considered by Customs to be a
coastwise activity, the lack of statutory wording
specifically extending the salvage law to Puerto Rico was
cited by the agency as evidence that foreign salvage ships
may operate there. 137 The agency pointed out that the
Jones Act had been expressly extended to Puerto Rico (and
other U.S. territories, districts, and possessions) by two
other laws. 138 This is somewhat misleading, however,
since the laws referred to extend the coastwise laws to
these areas, and not just the Jones Act. Since Customs
considers salvage to be coastwise trade, there appears to be
an inconsistency with respect to its application.
Alaska, on the other hand, must employ U.S. salvage
ships in its waters. Despite the obvious Congressional
intent to the contrary in enacting the salvage legislation,
Customs does apply the salvage requirements to Alaska. 139
In fact, the law has applied to both Alaska and Hawaii since
their admittance to the Union as states. Therefore, it may
be said that the salvage portion of U.S. cabotage law
applies only to the fifty states. of the Union and to none of
the territories, districts, or possessions.
A further inconsistency in the administering of the
salvage law seems to exist with respect to where U:8.
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salvage ships must be built. Although Customs considers
salvage to be coastwise trade in nature, a U.S. salvage
vessel need not be U.S.-built. The reason for this,
according to the agency, is that the language of the salvage
law bars participation in U.S. salvage unless the vessel is
American. The language does not indicate whether the vessel
has to be American-built, and Customs has interpreted this
to mean that a foreign-bUilt ship may participate in the
salvage industry.140
This logic could be applied to the towing industry as
well, albeit with less success. A U.S.-built vessel is a
requirement for participation in the towing industry. The
language of the 1940 TOWing Act seems to allow towing by
vessels that have a U.S. registry ~ an enrollment and
license. As stated in chapter II, a foreign-bUilt vessel
has been able to procure a U.S. registry since the Panama
Canal Act, which had been in place 28 years before the
towing law was enacted. Why, then, cannot a foreign-bUilt,
U.S.-registered towboat engage in towing in the United
States while a foreign-bUilt, U.S.-registered ship may
engage in salvage? Both are activities considered to be
coastwise trade. However, through an apparent
administrative inconsistency, foreign-bUilt, U.S.-registered
towboats are prohibited from engaging in towing, whereas the
same is not true for salvage.
We have established, then, that the transportation of
anything of value, including passengers, is included in the
regime of coastwise trade. Other services that are
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provided are not deemed to be coastwise trade in nature,
with the exception of towing and salvage. Moreover, the
performance of towing and salvage services often carry with
them easier participatory requirements, such that
foreign-built and foreign-flag vessels may be eligible, in
some cases.
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importation law.
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licensed to carryon the coastwise trade did not have to pay
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American crew, because coastwise-licensed vessels paid a
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three-fourths of the crew were American. In addition, U.S.
vessels entering ports of the U.S. from foreign voyages paid
a duty of fifty cents per ton unless all the officers and at
least two-thirds of the crew were American. Act of March I,
1817, ch. 31, sec. 1.
Other early laws imposing a duty on the tonnage of
ships included:
March 2, 1799, chapter 22, section 63, 1 Stat. 627.
Provided that the tonnage duties payable on entry are to be
paid before a permit to unload is issued.
May 1, 1802. chapter 45, 2 Stat. 181. Exempted vessels
under 50 tons that were engaged in the coasting trade on the
Mississippi River from duty.
April 27, 1816, chapter 107, 3 Stat. 310. Recodified
existing tonnage duty amounts.
January 14, 1817, chapter 3, 3 Stat. 344. Continued the
duty levels as per the Act of JUly 20. 1790, except for
foreign vessels from countries with which U.S. vessels were
not permitted to go and trade. The tonnage duty on these
ships was set at two dollars per ton.
May 31, 1830, chapter 219, 4 Stat. 425. Abolished the
duties for U.S. ships on which all the officers and
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the duties for foreign vessels, provided that the vessel's
flag country had a similar arrangement for U.S. ships.
August 30, 1842, chapter 270, 5 Stat. 548. Increased by 10%
the duty on merchandise imported in foreign bottoms,
although it did not change tonnage duties.
12. 4 Attorney General's opinion (O.A.G.) 188, JUly 20, 1843.
13. Act of February 15, 1893, 52nd Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 117,
27 Stat. 455.
14. U.S. v. 250 Kegs of Nails, 61 Fed. 410 (1894).
15. Act of February 17, 1898, sec. 1, 30 Stat. 248.
16. A letter from the Secretary of Treasury dated February 9,
1898 indicated that coastwise shipments from Seattle to
Alaska were being transshipped in Vancouver, using foreign
ships on both legs of the voyage. U.S. Congress, Senate,
Con~ressional Record-Senate. February 15, 1898, vol. 31, p.
1729. While Treasury held this to be a violation of the
coastwise laws, there was some concern that the courts might
not concur. Id.
17. Id. This specific language was seen by Treasury as "a
stronger and more explicit statement" of U.S. cabotage law.
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18. Compare, for example, the relevant provisions of the Panama
Canal Act, detailing documentation requirements, and the Act
of February 17, 1898, which prohibited the coastwise
shipment of goods and passengers.
19. The Jones Act provides that:
"No merchandise shall be transported by water,
or by land and water, on penalty of forfeiture
thereof, between points in the United States
embraced within the coastwise laws,
either directly or via a foreign port, or for
any part of the transportation, in any other
.vessel than a vessel built in and documented
under the laws of the United States "
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Act of June 5,
1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 999.
20. Again, the Alaska trade was a major factor in the inclusion
of this wording. Senator Wesley Jones, a strong proponent
of the bill, was from the state of Washington, and he had
concerns about cargo bound from the continental U.S. for
Alaska being diverted to Vancouver for shipment on Canadian
vessels. Jones held that "we have a d1rect competitor with
our shipping in Canadian shipping. It seems to me whenever
we can legitimately give an advantage to our shipping, we
ought to do it." U.S. Congress, Senate, Con~ressional
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Record-Senate. vol. 59, pt. 7, May 20, 1920, p. 7348.
21 .. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, section 1. See also Clinton
H. Whitehurst, Jr., The U.S. Merchant Marine. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983, p. 26.
22. H.R. 10378 stated:
Sec. 29. That no merchandise shall be
transported water, or by land and water, on
penalty of forfeiture thereof, between points
in the United States .,. embraced within the
coastwise laws, either directly or via a
foreign port, or for any part of the
transportation, in any other vessel than a
vessel built in and documented under the laws
of the United States and wholly owned by
persons who are citizens of the United States.
or vessels to which the privilege of engaging
in the coastwise trade is extended by sections
18 or 24 of this act. No agent or employee of
a common carrier shall check baggage, issue
bills of lading, or otherwise arrange for
through carriage of property between ports or
places in the United States ., .. embraced
within the coastwise laws when all or any part
of the carriage is in a foreign vessel, and no
person in the capacity of agent or otherwise,
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understanding, order, or any form of contract
whatsoever, shall sell or contract to sell to
any person the right to travel by water, or by
land and water, either directly or via a
foreign port, or for any part of the
transportation, on a foreign ship between
ports or places in the United States
U.S. Congress, Senate, Coniressional
Record-Senate. vol. 59, pt. 7, May 13, 1920,
p. 6990.
Interestingly, the bill did not specifically require
U.S.-built ships for the passenger-carrying trade, whereas
it did for the carriage of merchandise. The reason for this
is unclear, especially considering the general nervousness
surrounding the penetration of foreign-built ships into the
coastwise trade. The bill may have been modelled after the
Passenger Ship Act which simply bars foreign vessels,
without specifically addressing the construction issue.
23. Id., p. 7348.
24. The passenger section of H.R. 10378 was deleted by the
Senate on May 20, 1920 after an amendment was offered by
Senator McCumber of North Dakota to have the part stricken
from the bill. U.S. Congress, Senate, Congo Rec. May 20,
1920, vol. 59, pt. 7, p. 7347-7350. He cited the
inconvenience to passengers who desired to travel from
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Minnesota or other inland U.S. points to Alaska and had to
travel through Canada for part of the voyage:" if a
passenger desires to go by rail on an American railway or
Canadian railway to Vancouver, he ought to have a right to
buy a ticket through from the Canadian port of Vancouver to
an Alaskan port or any other port in our possessions." Id.,
pp. 7347-7348.
Jones offered to remove the language regarding land
transportation to appease McCumber's concerns, but there
were other objections to the language. Senator Nelson
complained that the language .placed an undue burden on
travellers. He cited an example of a friend who waited for
several weeks in Hawaii for an American ship to take him to
the mainland. Since none came, he was forced to take a
British ship and pay a $200 penalty. Id., p. 6810.
25. 590 F.2d 1156, D.C. Cir. (1978). See also Robert W.
Gruendel, "The Weakening Grip of United States Cabotage
Law," Fordham International Law Journal. vol. 4, 1981, pp.
399-403. Hereafter cited as Gruendel. The Virgin Islands,
although part of the United States, do not come within the
purview of U.S. cabotage law and are the equivalent of a
foreign country. For a further discussion of this, see
chapter four.
26. See Gruendel, p. 400.
27. Id., p. 402.
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28. Act tQ prQvide fQr the better security Qf the lives Qf
passen~ers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part
by steam: JUly 7, 1838, 25th CQng., 2nd sess., ch, 191.
29. By the 1793 act, any ship Qbtaining a license had tQ be
dQmestically cQnstructed and Qwned.
30. PrQvidence Daily JQurnal. June 21 and 22, 1838.
31. PrQvidence Daily JQurnal. June 24, 25, 26, 27, 1838. It was
learned frQm survivQrs that the Pulaski's engineer had
bQasted befQre the vQyage that it WQuld be the fastest trip
ever between CharlestQn and BaltimQre. It was believed that
the bQilers had been strained beyond their limits.
32. Act Qf May 27, 1848. 30th CQng., 1st Sess., ch, 48. The
law was recQdified in 1970 and is still in fQrce. 19 U.S.C.
293.
33. CQn~reSsiQnal GIQbe. VQI. 17, 30th CQng., 1st sess., April
18, 1848, p. 642.
34. Act Qf June 19, 1886. 49th CQng., 1st sess., ch, 421 24
Stat. 81.
35. U.S. Congress, CQn~ressiQnal RecQrd. February 3, 1886, VQI.
17, part 2, p. 1108. Statement Qf the Chairman, HQuse
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Committee of Shipbuilding and Ship-owning Interests.
36. Act of February 17, 1898. 55th Cong., 2nd sess., ch. 26,
30 Stat. 248.
37. Letter from Secretary of the Treasury L. J. Gage to Senator
William P. Frye, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee.
Con~ressional Record. vol. 31, pp. 1729-1730, February 15,
1898.
38. London Guarantee & Accident Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California, 279 U.S. 110, (1928). 124-125;
quoted from Gibbons v. Ogden 9 Wheat. I, 215. et seq.
39. Gibbons v. Ogden 9 Wheat. 215-217.
40. Id .. p. 218.
41. Id.
42. City of New York v. Miln. 11 Peters 136-137; Jan .. 1837.
The case concerned a New York state law enacted in 1824
requiring the master of a ship bringing immigrants into New
York to make a report stating the name. age, and last legal
settlement of all foreign passengers ..
43. Id .. p. 139.
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44. 4 a.A.G. 270, November 2, 1843.
46. Id.
46. Two passenger cases considered simultaneously by the Supreme
Court in 1849 further addressed the principle of state
taxing power over vessels in the foreign and interstate
trades that had been the focus of the City of New York v.
Miln case. Smith v. Turner, Norris v. the City of Boston,
48 U.S. 282-572. In Smith v. Turner, the New York City
Health Commissioner was required by New York state law to
charge passenger ships in the foreign and coastwise trades
with a hospital tax based on the number of passengers and
crew on board. The court held that this law was
unconstitutional and therefore void. Norris v. the City of
Boston was a similar case brought by the master of a·
Canadian schooner who was required by Massachusetts state
law to pay a tax of two dollars per passenger brought from
overseas. This law was also held to be unconstitutional and
void by the U.S. Supreme Court.
47. Ravesies v. U.S.; 35 Fed. Rep. 919; July 24, 1888. Id. The
Circuit Court for the Southern District of Alabama
reversed and remanded the lower court's decision in this
case, but only to the extent that coa$twise trade applies
only to the seacoast, and not to navigable rivers. The
inclusion of passenger transportation in the term coastwise
trade was not disputed by the Circuit Court.
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48. Shannon v. Streckfus Steamers, 131 S.W. 2d 836 (1939).
49. The Granada 35 Fed. Supp. 892 et. seq .. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, December 4, 1940.
50. 28 a.A.G. 204, 208.
51. Foreign cruise ships repositioning between Los Angeles and
Miami will take passengers with them and make a stop at, for
example, Aruba, which is classified by the Customs Service
as a non-nearby foreign port.
52. 18 a.A.G. 445 et. seq.
53. Id., p. 446.
54. 28 a.A.G. 204.
55. 19 C.F.R. 4.80a.
56. 29 G.A.G. 318.
57. See London Guarantee & Accident Company Ltd. v. Industrial
Accident Commission of California 27~ u.s. 109 (1928),
where the court ruled that the transport of passengers for
hire on pleasure trips is commerce for the purposes of
admiralty jurisdiction. Whether the courts would rule that
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this is also "coastwise trade" is uncertain.
Congress attempted to bring the cruises-to-nowhere
under greater U.S. control in 1965 with a series of bills
aimed at safeguarding U.S. passengers from potentially
unsanitary and unsafe shipboard conditions. U.S. Congress,
House, Hearin~s before the Merchant Marine Subcommittee on
H.B. 2836. 6272. 10109. 10327. Au~ust 24. 25 .. 26. 31. 1965.
Although none of the bills would have required a coastwise
license to engage in cruises-to-nowhere, the most protective
of the bills required the filing of information related to
financial responsibility and a guarantee that the foreign
operator's rates would not be prejudicial to U.S.
operators, as well as a finding that the operation was not
detrimental to the commerce of the U.S. Id., p. 3. In
addition, one of the bills would have required all cruises
to meet the safety standards of U.S. coastwise-qualified
vessels, if the enforcing agency deemed necessary. None of
the initiatives mustered the political support to be enacted
into law.
58. 30 a.A.G. 44.
59. Id., p. 46.
60. 34 a.A.G. 340.
61. 36 a.A.G. 352, August 13, 1930.
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62. Id., p. 354.
63. U.S. Customs Service, T.D. 55147(19); T.D. 55193(2). A
federal court case also established that the transport of
passengers for hire on navigable waters for deep sea fishing
is commerce, even if the voyage is to and from the same
port. London Guarantee & Accident Co. Ltd. v. Industrial
Accident Commission of California. 279 U.S. 110 (1928).
64. Gillentine v. McKeand 426 F.2d 717 (1970).
65. For an excellent discussion of charterboat law, see Mary
Nathalie Peter, "Chartering Recreational Boats in the United
States: A Compilation and Analysis of Applicable Federal
Maritime Law." (Master of Arts thesis), University of Rhode
Island. 1984.
66. Id., p. 67. A person is normally considered a passenger if
they contribute in any way to the costs of a voyage.
67. 19 C.F.R. 4.80(a)(1).
68. 19 C.F.R. 4.80(a)(2). The Customs Service classifies nearby
foreign ports as those outside the scope of U.S. cabotage
law in North America. Central Americ~. some of the West
Indies (including the Bahamas, but not including, for
example. Aruba), Bermuda, and the Virgin Islands.
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69. u.s. Customs Service, unpublished Customs memo dated
February 11, 1985. Personal communication with Edward B.
Gable, Director of Carriers, Drawback, and Bonds Division,
U.S. Customs Service. "Customs Regulations Amendments
Relating to Passengers on Foreign Vessels Taken on Board and
Landed in the United States," Federal Register. 50:126, July
1, 1985, pp. 26981-26984.
70. 19 C.F.R. 4.80(a)(3).
71. U.S. Customs Service, unpublished decision, File Number
105713, July 14, 1982.
72. The legal regime affecting the transportation of dredge
spoil is differentiated from that affecting the activity of
dredging.
73. U.S. Customs Service, unpublished decision, File Number
104762, June 27, 1980. See also U.S. Customs Service,
unpublished decision, File Number 108252 PH, March 19,
1986.
74. Paul Hegland, Carriers RUlings Branch, U.S. Customs Service,
personal communication, March 28, 1986.
75. The purpose of the dredging and transport was to construct
artificial gravel islands to protect drilling rigs from
shifting ice.
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76. U.S. Customs Service, Customs Ruling, June 28, 1983 C.S.D.
83-94, pp. 23-26. For a discussion of what are deemed
coastwise points on the Outer Continental Shelf and in the
territorial sea, see chapter 4.
77. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., v. Ludwig, 486 F. Supp. 1312
(1980).
78. P.L. 97-389. Act of December 29, 1982, sec. 502, 96 Stat.
1954; 46 App. U.S.C. 883. Foreign-flag incinerator ships
were exempted from the Jones Act as long as they were under
construction for U.S. owners by May I, 1982. It is unclear
from the statute whether it is the transportation of the
waste itself which is exempt, or whether it includes
transportation of things of value as well.
79. The foreign dredges Holm, Leviathan, Nereus, and Triton were
employed to raise the grade of Galveston Island -- about two
thousand acres in all an average of eight feet. The
project required over 11 million yards of fill. For an
excellent report of this project, see Daniel J. Donohue,
"The Foreign-Built Dredge Act: Its Passage and Its Place
Among Statutory Restrictions on Foreign Competition in the
American Dredging Industry," unpubli.shed paper.
80. See Donohue, p. 10.
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81. The Act of May 28, 1906 provided in part that:
"A foreign-built dredge shall not, under
penalty of forfeiture, engage in dredging in
the United States unless documented as a vessel
of the United States." Foreign-built Dredge
Act. Act of May 28, 1906; ch. 2566, sec. 1; 46
App. U.S.C. 292. Hereafter cited as 1906 act.
In addition, a second section was included which has
since been deleted as obsolete. It directed the
Commissioner of Navigation to document the five foreign
dredges as U.S. ships. Section two of the 1906 law stated:
"That the Commissioner of Navigation is hereby
authorized and directed to document as vessels
of the United States the foreign-built dredges
Holm, Leviathan, Nereus, and Triton, owned by
American citizens and now employed at
Galveston, and the dredge Sea Lion, now under
construction abroad for use at Galveston, on
which an American citizen, the contractor at
Galveston, has an option." 1906 act, sec. 2.
82. In the former case, a foreign-built.dredge could obtain a
registry simply by being U.S.-owned and greater than five
net tons and would therefore be U.S.-documented.
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83. In the Coast Guard documentation regulations, there is a
note to the registry section which states that:
"A foreign-built vessel documented under this
section is not permitted to engage in dredging
in the United States ... " 46 C.F.R. sec.
67.13-3 note.
84. Mr. Joseph A. Iglesias, Coast Guard documentation office,
personal communication, October 8, 1985.
85. Congressman Grosvenor, the House manager of the dredging
bill, stated that:
" this bill proposes that hereafter,
foreign-built dredges shall come under the
regular laws of the United States in regard to
foreign ships ... and that hereafter all
dredges shall be treated as other foreign ships
are treated." U.S. Congress, House, Congo Rec.
vol. 40, p. 7029 (1906). When Congressman
Loudenslager asked what portion of the bill
prevented the future use of other foreign
dredges, Grosvenor replied that the whole bill
did.
It is unclear, when section 2 of the dredging law was
repealed. whether the legislators who changed the law
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intended that any foreign-built dredge could thereafter be
used to dredge in the United States, provided that it had
proper documentation.
86. Of course, if the dredge was foreign-built it would not be
eligible for a coastwise license anyway.
87. U.S. Customs Service, C.S.D. 85-11, Customs Bulletin and
DecisiQns. 19:7, February 13, 1985, p. 20. See also U.S.
Congress, House, Con~. Rec. vol. 40, p. 7029 (1906).
Customs and the Coast Guard share oversight of the dredging
law.
88. U.S. CustQms Service, C.S.D. 85-11, pp. 20-21.
Interestingly, Customs also applied the dredging statute to
the Outer Continental Shelf under the OCS Lands Act.
89. 41 O.A.G. 189, 199-200, (August 7, 1963).
90. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. LudWig, 486 F. Supp. 1305
(1980); Interestingly, the Coast Guard issued the dredge a
registry with an endorsement prohibiting it from engaging in
the coastwise trade, although not specifically prohibiting
it from dredging in the United States. The reasQning used
by the CQurt in this case bears SQm~ examinatiQn. The
plaintiffs argued that the JQnes Act prQvisQ barring vessels
at one time foreign-registered frQm engaging in the
cQastwise trade is brQader than the main bQdy Qf the
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statute, which refers only to the transport of merchandise,
and dredging should be included within the meaning of
coastwise trade. The court, in rejecting that argument,
held that "a cardinal rule of statutory construction is that
the scope of a proviso is no broader than the language it
modifies." Using that reasoning, one might wonder why an
American-built ship, at some point registered overseas,
could not legally obtain a coastwise license, provided only
that it did not carry merchandise.
91. Id., p. 1312.
92. An earlier Customs Court decision had also tackled the issue
of dredge documentation and had held that "the use to which
the dredge in question was put, cannot fairly be said to
come within the ordinary common definition of a vessel
documented under the laws of the United States to engage in
the foreign or coasting trade "Standard Dredging Co.
v. U.S., T.D. 48136 (1936).
93. The statute provided:
"That all steam tug-boats, not of the United
States, found employed in tOWing documented
vessels of the United State~ plying from one
port or place in the same to another, shall
forfeit and pay the sum of fifty cents per ton
on the ad~easurement of every such vessel so
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towed by them respectively, as aforesaid, which
sum may be recovered by libel or suit." An act
further to prevent smuggling and for other
purposes, section 21, July 18, 1866, 39th
Cong., 1st sess., chapter 201, 14 Stat. 182.
94. The 1866 act was amended by adding the following two
provisos:
"Provided, that this section shall not apply,
or be held to apply, to any case where the said
towing in whole or in part is within or upon
foreign waters. And provided, that any foreign
railroad company or corporation, whose road
enters the United States by means of a ferry or
tugboat, may own such boat, and it shall be
subject to no other or different restrictions
or regulations in such employment, than if
owned by a citizen of the United States." An
act to amend the twenty-first section of "an
act further to prevent smuggling and for other
purposes," approved February 25, 1867, 39th
Cong., 2nd sess., chapter 78.
95. U.S. v. Steam Tug Pilot, 50 Fed. ~ep. 439, April 19, 1892.
In a case decided simultaneously, the court reversed a lower
court ruling holding that a foreign tug was liable for
penalties for towing an American vessel from the high seas
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to Tacoma, when part of the towing was in Canadian waters.
However, the court hinted that if it had been alleged that a
foreign tug had entered Canadian waters collusively for the
purposes of evading the towing statute, a different ruling
may have been issued.
96. U.S. Congress, House, Towin~ Between American Ports.
Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine &
Fisheries. U.S. House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 2nd
sess., on H.R. 8533, April 14, 1938, U.S. Government
Printing Office: Washington, 18 pp. Hereafter cited as
1938 Towing Hearing.
97. U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 8533, 75th Cong., 2nd sess.; A
bill to amend seotion 4370 of the Reyised Statutes of the
United States CU.S.C .. 1934 edition. title 46. sec. 316).
98. Id., section Ca).
99. E.S. Land, Chairman of the U.S. Maritime Commission, pointed
out in a letter that the $250 penalty would be less than the
existing law anytime the towed vessel was greater than 1000
tons. Letter to Schuyler O. Bland, Chairman of the Merchant
Marine & Fisheries Committee dated March 4, 1938. Hereafter
cited as March 4, 1938 letter.
100. Letter from J. U. Johnson, Acting Secretary of Commerce to
Chairman Bland, dated March 15, 1938. This wording was
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incorporated into the legislation that was finally enacted
into law.
101. See 1938 Towing Hearing. Statement of Ralph Emerson,
Representative of the maritime unions of the Committee for
Industrial Organization. See also, letters from Foss Co.,
Inc., to Chairman Bland dated October 30, 1937, and December
10, 1937; letters from the Great Lakes Towing Company to
Chairman Bland dated December 7, 1937 and March 16, 1938;
and letter from Atlantic Coast & Gulf of Mexico Tow Boat
Association to Chairman Bland dated April 15, 1938.
102. Id. Because of the wage disparities between U.S. tugs and
Canadian tugs on the Great Lakes Canadian tugs were able to
operate more cheaply than U.S. tugs and undercut U.S. rates.
U.S. Congress, House, Towin~ Betyeen Ports by Forei~n
vessels. Hearin~s before the Committee on Merchant Marine &
Fisheries, 76th Cong" 3rd sess,; See statement of H. N.
Hobart of Great Lakes Towing Company, on H.R. 200, January
23, 1940, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington,
D.C. ,pp. 10-11. Hereafter cited as 1940 Towing Hearing,
U.S. wages were estimated to be $3666.60 per month per
Ship, while Canadian wages were $945 per month.
103. See Foss letter of December 10, 1~37 in 1938 Towing Hearing,
This provision survived the legislative process and is still
part of U.S. coastwise law at 46 App. U,S,C. 316(a).
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104. See statement of Carleton W. Meyer, commerce counsel, New
York Central System at 1938 Towing Hearing.
105. See 46 App. U.S.C. 883, third proviso, An act to amend
section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 74th Congo ,
1st sess., ch. 355, July 2, 1935.
106. See March 4, 1938 letter.
107. H.R. 200, A Bill to Amend Section 4370 of the Reyised
Statutes of the United States (U.S.C. 1934 edition, title
46, sec. 316).
108. See the comments of the Department of Commerce on H.R. 8283,
Letter to Chairman Bland, March 6, 1940, in Towing Between
American Ports by Foreign vessels. House Report 2040, 76th
Cong., 3rd sess., May 1, 1940, pp. 3-4. Hereafter cited as
1940 Towing Report. The language in question stated that a
person owning a qualified tugboat had to be a citizen
"within the meaning of the laws respecting the documentation
of vessels," as opposed to the earlier language requiring
that person to be a "citizen of the United States." Several
other changes were made to the salvage portion of the bill.
109. U.S. Customs Service, T.D. 54600 (57), vol. 93, May 22,
1958. In a similar ruling issued in 1979, the agency
decided that a foreign-bUilt, U.S.-owned tug could not
engage in towing services within a harbor. August 15, 1979.
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case number 103910. The rUling cited an earlier holding
that docking and undocking services provided within a harbor
are towing within the meaning of the towing statute. Case
number 102240, November 4, 1976. It is unclear why this
interpretation was necessary, given the express language to
that effect in the statute. In its analysis of the 1979
ruling request, Customs again asserted that a tug had to be
coastwise-qualified in order to engage in towing, consistent
with its 1958 rUling. See August 15, 1979 rUling.
110. U.S. Customs Service, Case number 104220, letter dated
October 17, 1979. The firm that requested the ruling argued
that since the anticipated towing would be done by a
U.S.-owned tug with a valid Coast Guard document, the
operation should be allowed, even if the tug was not
coastwise-qualified.
111. U.S. Customs Service, letter dated April 7, 1954, file
number 216.131. See also letter dated July 9, 1956, file
number 216.132; letter dated January 19, 1954, file number
3-70113 and undated letter, file number 216.131.
112. U.S. Customs Service, letter dated October 4, 1967, file
number MS 216.132 R. Other rUlings issued on the subject
include letter dated September 24, 1965, file number MS
212.01 M; letter dated June 26, 1969, file number MS 212.01
M. For towing voyages via a foreign port, see letter dated
November 12, 1964, file number MS 216.132 which held that
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the tow was in violation when the facts showed that it was
substantially continuous voyage; and letters dated August 3,
1966, file number MS 216.132 R, and June 9. 1960. file
number MA 216.132, which held that no violation occurred
when the facts demonstrated that the voyage via a foreign
port was essentially two separate voyages.
113. U.S. Customs Service, letter dated August 18, 1970, file
number CR 212.01 PH.
114. U.S. Customs Service, letter dated September 24, 1970, file
number CR 212.01 PH.
115. U.S. Customs Service, memorandum dated June 2, 1966. See
letter dated August 18, 1970, where it was pointed out that
the in rem penalty provided for in the towing statute was
persuasive evidence that Congress intended the law to apply
to any tow between U.S. ports because that type of penalty
is only collectible when the offending tug is in U.S.
waters. File number CR 212.01 PH.
116. H.R. 2466, A bill to make miscellaneous chan~es in laws
affectini the United States Coast Guard. and for other
purposes. Staff working draft, November 27, 1985. pp.
16-17.
117. Id., p. 16. The bill was vetoed by the President in March,
1986 because of other provisions.
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118. As enacted, the law stated:
"That Canadian vessels of all descriptions may
render aid or assistance to Canadian or other
vessels wrecked or disabled in the waters of
the United States contiguous to the Dominion of
Canada: Provided that this act shall not take
effect until proclamation by the President
declaring that the privilege of aiding American
or other vessels wrecked or disabled in
Canadian waters contiguous to the United States
has been extended by the Government. of the
Dominion of Canada and declaring this act to be
in force: And provided further, That this act
shall cease to be in force from and after the
date of proclamation by the President to the
effect that said reciprocal privilege has been
withdrawn or revoked by said Government of the
Dominion of Canada." An act to aid vessels
wrecked or disabled in the waters coterminous
to the United States and the Dominion of
Canada, June 19, 1878, chapter 324, 20 Stat.
175.
119. The present wording of the statute in the Code is:
"Canadian vessels and wrecking appurtenance may
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render aid and assistance to Canadian or other
vessels and property wrecked, disabled, or in
distress in the waters of the United States
contiguous to the Dominion of Canada. This
section shall be construed to apply to the
canal and improvement of the waters between
Lake Erie and Lake Huron, and to the waters of
the Saint Mary's River and Canal: And provided
further, That this section shall cease to be in
force ... II 46 App. U.S.C. 726.
120. The pertinent part of article II of the treaty of May 18,
1908 provides:
" that vessels and wrecking appliances,
either from the United States or from the
Dominion of Canada, may salve any property
wrecked and may render aid and assistance to
any vessels wrecked, disabled or in distress in
the waters or on the shores of the other
country in that portion of the St. Lawrence
River through which the International Boundary
line extends, and, in Lake Ontario, Lake Erie,
Lake St. Clair, Lake Huron, and Lake Superior,
and in the Rivers Niagara. Detroit, St. Clair,
and Ste. Marie, and the canals at Sault Ste.
Marie, and on the shores and in the waters of
the other country along the Atlantic and
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Pacific coasts within a distance of thirty
miles from the international boundary on such
coasts." Article II of the Treaty with Great
Britain dated May 18, 1908, 35 Stat. 2036.
Lake Michigan is the only Great Lake where the
salvage rights are reserved exclusively to
American vessels. Hereafter cited as 1908
Treaty.
121. Section Cd) of H.R. 8533 provided that, in addition to not
superceding the Act of June 19, 1878 or article II of the
1908 Treaty:
"That no foreign vessel shall, under penalty of
forfeiture, engage in salvaging operations in
any other portions of the Great Lakes, their
connecting and tributary waters, including the
portion of the Saint Lawrence River through
which the international boundary line extends,
than those specified in article II of the
treaty above referred to."
122. March 4, 1938 letter. As evidence, Chairman Land produced
correspondence with the American-Hawaii Steamship Company
that outlined the inadequacy of V.S. salvage facilities on
the west coast. Letter from the U.S. Maritime Commission to
the Secretary of Commerce dated November II, 1937.
Hereafter cited as November II, 1937 letter.
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American-Hawaii had requested permission to use Canadian
salvage equipment stationed at Victoria, British Columbia.
123. See March 4, 1938 letter.
124. See letter from the Secretary of Commerce to the Chairman of
the Maritime Commission, dated December 9, 1937. Hereafter
cited as December 9, 1937 letter.
125. See March 4, 1938 letter.
126. See letter from the Secretary of Commerce to Chairman Bland,
dated March 15, 1938. Hereafter cited as March 15, 1938
letter.
127. Article I of the treaty states, in part, that:
vessels and rescue apparatus, public or
private, of either country, may aid or assist
vessels of their own nationality, including the
passengers and crew thereof, which may be
disabled or in distress on the shores or in the
territorial waters of the other country ... "
Article I of the Treaty of June 13. 1935
between the United States, and Mexico. 49 Stat.
3359. Hereafter cited as 1935 Treaty.
The provisions of this treaty are in force within 200 miles
-116-
of the boundary on the Gulf of Mexico coast and 720 miles on
the Pacific coast. An obvious difference between this
treaty and the Canadian treaty is that under the latter,
ships of either country may salve vessels of either country,
whereas under the Mexican Treaty, ships may salve only
vessels of the same country.
The State Department had reviewed the impact of H.R.
8533, the original bill, on the Mexican treaty and, not
surprisingly, found that there would be no impact, since it
applied only to the Great Lakes. See letter from the
Secretary of State to Chairman Bland dated April 14, 1938.
128. Statement of William R. Vallance, 1940 Towing Hearing.
Hereafter cited as Vallance. The Maritime Commission
concurred in this in a letter to Chairman Bland dated March
27, 1939.
129. Statement of Captain W. J. Peterson, Pacific American
Steamship Association and the Shipowner's Association of the
West Coast, at 1940 Towing Hearing.
130. Id. See Vallance.
131. See 1940 Towing Hearing, statement of Captain Sweet, senior
navigation officer of the Depar~ment of Commerce, p. 14.
The amendment he proposed was made part of H.R. 200 and also
the final bill, H.R. 8283 and was enacted into law Virtually
intact.
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132. Id. Oversight of the law was shifted from the Secretary of
Commeroe to the Commissioner of Customs under Reorganization
Plan Number 3 of 1946, sections 101-104.
133. See 1940 Towing Report, p. 6.
134. U.S. Congress, Con2ressional Record. vol. 86, pt. 5, May 6,
1940, p. 5605.
135. U.S. Customs Service, letter to the Maritime Institute for
Research and Industrial Development, case number 107038 PH.
136. Id. See also Customs telegram dated June 6, 1953; and
Customs ruling of June 10, 1974, case number 100949.
137. Id.
138. 48 U.S.C. 744 and 46 App. U.S.C. 877.
139. Id.
140. U.S. Customs Service, Carrier RUlings Branch, Paul Hegland.
personal communication. April 7. 1986.
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Chapter IV
THE COASTWISE AREA
Some attempts have been made to define what is meant by
a coastwise activity, both historically and at present, and
to demonstrate what types of ships may engage in a coastwise
activity. The geographic area of application of the
coastwise trade laws, or the "coastwise area," is also
important to this discussion. Generally speaking, when a
ship is involved in a cabotage 'activity, such as the
carriage of merchandise, between points in the coastwise
area, such as Boston and Philadelphia, the ship is engaged
in the coastwise trade and must be qualified to carryon
that trade. On the other hand, if the ship is operating
outside the coastwise area, the ship need not be
coastwise-qualified (see Appendix D, p. 194).
There has not always been a clear consensus regarding
what the coastwise area should be. In fact, because of the
vague wording of early statutes, much of the federal poliCy
toward the coastwise area was formulated in the courts. The
Constitution provided little guidance to early policymakers,
stating only that Congress has the right to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, without delimiting a
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seaward boundary between state and federal control. 1 In an
1824 Supreme Court case, that boundary was held to be the
navigable waters of the United States, so that federal
control over navigation extended within state territorial
waters. 2
The implication for the coastwise trade at the time was
that federal law applied to coastal shipments in navigable
waters whether or not the shipment was interstate. In other
words, a non coastwise-qualified ship could not operate in
the coastwise trade simply because it was involved in
intra-state commerce. In fact, another Supreme Court case
the following year sharpened the definition of the coastwise
area by including within that area "commercial intercourse,
carried on between different districts in different states,
between different districts in the same state, and between
different places in the same district, on the sea-coast, or
on a navigable river. ,,3
Where Congress had left some ambiguity concerning the
geographical application of the coastwise trade laws, the
federal courts made it clear that they should apply to the
navigable waters of the coast and rivers of the United
States. 4 Ravesies v. U.S. (1889) did much to clear up the
application of coastwise trade law to navigable rivers. At
least three cases from the mid 19th century held federal law
inapplicable to navigation on a river completely within a
state, despite an earlier rUling to the contrary.5 It
might be argued that Ravesies v. U.S. scored something of a
victory for federal control over inland navigation by
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applying federal law to "coasting trade vessels bound from a
district in one state to a district in the same or any other
state, whether they navigate rivers or the seacoast
proper. ,,6
Clearly then, the courts played the dominant role in
shaping the extent of the coastwise area, or the area in
which U.S. coastwise law would apply. Court involvement in
this aspect of cabotage policy resulted directly from the
ambiguity and inconsistency of statutory wording. For
example, the Act of March 1, 1817 prohibited the transport
of merchandise in foreign vessels between American "ports"
and restricted importation of merchandise into the U.S. from
foreign "ports or places." The Act of July 7, 1838 regulated
the transport of merchandise and passengers "in or upon the
bays, lakes, rivers or other navigable waters." The
Passenger Ship Act provided that only U.S. ships could
transport passengers between "places or ports" in the United
States. Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
prohibits transport of merchandise in foreign vessels
between "points in the United States, including Districts.
Territories, and possessions thereof embraced within the
coastwise laws." This type of wording led to uncertainty in
the application of the laws and abuses by operators who were
able to take advantage of loopholes. For example, the
Passenger Ship Act was amended in 1898 to include the
transport by way of a foreign port as a prohibited action by
a foreign passenger vessel. The reason for this policy
change was the growing tendency of operators to transship
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merchandise destined between U.S. ports at a foreign port,
using foreign vessels for both legs of the voyage. 7 Thus,
domestic shipping in the navigable waters of the U.S. was
brought under the purview of the coastwise trade laws
primarily by the courts.
Territories and Possessions
Presumably, it has always been clear what was meant by
the United States when that parameter was used in a
cabotage statute. However, things became less clear when
considering U.S. possessions and territories. For that
reason, laws have been enacted specifically to extend the
coastwise laws to possessions as they were acquired. For
example, the Puerto Rico Organic Act extended to that island
"all the benefits of the coasting trade of the United
States; and the coasting trade between Puerto Rico and the
United States shall be regulated in accordance with the
provisions of law applicable to such trade between any two
great coasting districts of the United States. H8
Similarly, the trade from Alaska and Hawaii to the U.S. was
reserved for coastwise qualified vessels. 9
All territories and possessions of the U.S. were
covered by a blanket provision in 1920 which included them
within the coastwise area and which meant that any ship
carrying on the coastwise trade to these areas had to be
coastwise-qualified. 10 One implication of this policy is
that the federal government was attempting to strengthen the
protectionist umbrella over the coastwise trade by mandating
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greater involvement of coastwise-qualified ships in U.S.
shipping. Alternatively, this policy was seen as a thinly
veiled form of colonialism, whereby distant islands were
forced to suffer the higher costs of U.S.-flag ships simply
because they were a U.S. possession.!!
Therefore, the "coastwise area." as it is referred to,
includes the navigable internal waters of the United States
and its territories and possessions, except those areas
specifically and statutorily excluded, as will be seen. The
coastwise trade of these exempted areas may, depending on
the type of exclusion, be served by foreign-flag or
U.S.-flag, foreign-built ships.
Territorial Sea<
Also included within the coastwise area is the U.S.
territorial sea, under customary international law. Any
structure or vessel, whether floating or anchored, in the
territorial sea is considered part of the coastwise area by
the Customs Service. In addition, some structures beyond
the territorial sea may be included in the coastwise area in
certain circumstances, as will be seen below.
The Outer Continental Shelf
Of growing concern in recent years is the extent to
which structures and vessels on the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) qualify as points or places in the United States for
the purposes of our cabotage laws. Technological advances
and the seaward search for oil have caused an increase in
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the number and complexity of ships servicing offshore oil
rigs. Several questions have arisen as to the applicability
of coastwise law to these service type ships, which include
diving inspection and survey boats, and icebreakers, among
others. On one hand, the Customs Service has held that a
ship of any nation may engage in offshore oil rig service
.operations, as long as the operation is not a coastwise
activity. On the other hand, U.S. supply boat interests
would like to see the coastwise laws applied to this
industry, to ensure U.S.-flag participation. There is at
present some degree of foreign-flag participation in these
non-transportation services. The resolution of these issues
may prove to be extremely important to the U.S. supply boat
industry, since that industry stands to lose a great deal of
economic benefit attributable to shipbuilding, manning, and
ship operation if the offshore oil and gas industry
experiences future growth.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) extended
the application of the Constitution, laws, and the civil and
political jurisdiction of the United States to the subsoil
and seabed of the OCS and to all artificial islands and
fixed structures erected there for the purpose of exploring
for, developing, removing, or transporting the
resources. 12 The Customs Service subsequently ruled that
the coastwise trade laws applied to mobile drill rigs during
the time they were attached to the OCS. 13 In other
rulings, Customs held that the laws also applied to. drilling
platforms and other artificial islands under section 4a of
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the OCSLA. 14 Simply stated, OCS equipment in offshore
waters was as much a coastwise point as the port of New
York. This was a significant extension of U.S. cabotage
policy inasmuch as it meant that any ships trading between
the rigs and any other coastwise point must qualify under
American cabotage law.
An amendment to the OCSLA was passed into law on
September 18, 1978. 15 The amendment changed section 4a of
the Act in that it included within federal jurisdiction
structures permanently or temporarily attached to the OCS
seabed. 16 This change brought anchored vessels, including
ships and other equipment temporarily in place, within the
purview of the cabotage laws. The legislative history
indicates that congress intended no change to existing law
as far as artificial islands and structures. fixed
platforms, and mobile drilling rigs attached to OCS were
concerned. 17 In other words, this equipment was still
considered to be a coastwise point; the change made by the
1978 amendment was that any equipment temporarily attached
to the seabed for the purposes of oil and gas exploitation,
was also to be considered a coastwise point.
The 1978 amendment was tested a number of times in the
next few years. On October 22, 1980, the Customs Service
ruled that a marker buoy in place on the OCS was an
"installation" for the purpose of the OCSLA and the
coastwise trade laws, namely the Jones Act. A marker buoy
is secured to the seabed temporarily and is used to mark an
offshore site which is to be drilled. Customs made the
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ruling because of the wording in section 4a of the OCSLA, as
amended, which stated that "devices temporarily attached to
the seabed for the purposes of exploring for resources
... " are considered coastwise pOints. 18 The significance
of this holding was that it required a launch barge being
used to transport a drill jacket from California to a marker
bUOy on the OCS to be coastwise-qualified. Drill jackets
are the frame derrick-like structure that hold the drilling
platform.
The main problem was that there were no U.S.-built
launch barges in existence and, according to companies
involved, no shipyards with the expertise to build them. In
fact, only four "super launch barges" (greater than 500 feet
and capable of deepwater launching) existed in 1984, and all
were foreign-bUilt. 19 To circumvent the 1980 rUling,
American drill jacket fabricating companies began towing
their drill jackets on foreign-built barges from the U.S.
mainland to open water and launching them in an area which
was ~ marked by a bUOY, and then making a secondary tow to
the anticipated drilling site, which ~ indicated by a
marker buoy.20
Complicating the situation was the competition from
Japan and Korea in drill jacket construction. Of the seven
deepwater oil exploration platforms installed or contracted
for on the U.S. west coast between 1980 and 1984, five were
won by Japanese builders, one by an American builder, and
one by a Korean builder. 21 A drill jacket built in Japan
or Korea may be transported from its place of manufacture to
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the American OCS by a foreign launch barge, regardless of
whether there is a marker bUoy at the launch site or not,
because it is being transported in the foreign trade.
Notwithstanding higher costs and logistical problems
associated with a trans-Pacific tow, American fabricators
are concerned about the effect of this competition.
Under this scenario, Customs reversed its 1980 ruling
and held that marker buoys do not constitute a coastwise
point for the purposes of the coastwise trade laws. 22 On
the other hand, Customs has continued to hold that a capped
or plugged exploratory well that will be produced is a
coastwise point, regardless of whether there is a marker
buoy at that point or not. 23
Warehouse vessels
Customs issued two other significant and controversial
rulings regarding coastwise trading privileges on the OCS.
The first was on December 6, 1984, and held that:
1. A warehouse vessel, used to supply a drill rig on
the OCS off Alaska, may be foreign flag; and
2. Supply vessels that transport forei~n-ori~in goods
from the anchored warehouse vessel to the drill rig
do not need to be coastwise-qualified. 24
A warehouse vessel is essentially a floating storage
shed which is used to support offshore drilling operations.
One benefit of using such a vessel is that the equipment and
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supplies necessary to sustain operations are close to the
rig, rather than in port. The question that had arisen was
whether these warehouse vessels, while tethered to the ocean
floor, were considered coastwise points. The effect of the
December 6, 1984 ruling was that anchored warehouse vessels
on the OCS were not considered by Customs to be coastwise
points for the purposes of the cabotage laws and, therefore,
foreign-flag supply vessels could be used between the drill
rig (a coastwise point) and the anchored warehouse ship (a
non coastwise point), the same as if it were foreign trade.
The ruling drew a substantial amount of protest from
the American supply boat industry, which claimed that
Customs was unfairly favoring foreign interests, contrary to
the intent of Congress. 25 In a subsequent letter to
Customs, several members of the Merchant Marine & Fisheries
Committee urged the agency to reverse its position on the
status of anchored warehouse vessels. 26 They indicated the
intent of Congress to include anchored warehouse vessels
within the meaning of "structures permanently or temporarily
attached to the seabed for the purposes of exploring for ...
resources. ,,27 Based on this "legislative intent," Customs
did reverse its position on the anchored warehouse vessel
issue on May 9, 1985, holding that such a ship does
constitute a point for the purposes of the Jones Act and
other coastwise trade statutes. 28 This type of legislative
action and wavering by the Customs Service raises obvious
concerns regarding the clarity of the statutes as they now
stand and, in fact, the agency has stated that it would
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welcome Congressional clarification of the applicability of
the coastwise laws to the outer continental shelf. 29
The second rUling was requested by Amoco Production
Company and concerned their planned ecs exploration
operations. Amoco had committed over $168 million to lease
a portion of the Navarin Basin for oil exploration, and
planned to use two foreign-flag "warehouse ships" to support
exploration work during the summer of 1985. 30 The
warehouse ships consisted of a converted bulk carrier of
Singapore registry, and a Danish registered product
tanker. 31 In addition to the warehouse ships, Amoco hired
four supply vessels: two U.S.-flag and two foreign-flag.
The purpose of the ruling was to determine whether Amoco
could service driftin~ warehouse ships on the American ecs
with foreign supply boats. The depth of water in the area
precluded anchoring, according to Amoco officials. 32 The
Customs Service ruled on January 17, 1985 that this was
legal, although any replacement supplies brought from Alaska
to the drill rigs, whether or not via the warehouse Ships,
would have to be on the U.S. supply boats. In addition, any
time the drifting warehouse ships are in the territorial
sea, they would be considered U.S. coastwise points,
regardless of whether they are anchored or not, and any
transfer from that point would have to be on U.S. supply
boats.
The action by Amoco was described by many officials in
government and the industry as a deliberate circumvention of
the coastwise trade laws and the ruling, although
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technically a correct one. exacerbated the controversy
within the industry.33
Dther DCS Activities
Customs has also ruled that in some cases the transport
of dredged gravel from one point on the DCS to another point
does not need to be done by coastwise-qualified vessels in
some cases. The rationale behind the rUling is that the
gravel -- used to create a "gravel island" to protect
drilling structures in ice-covered areas -- does not
constitute an "island" or "structure" until it rises above
the mean high water level. 34 Industry officials argue.
however. that the purpose of the gravel island is to assist
in the exploration of resources. and its construction should
be limited to U.S. coastwise-qualified Ships.35
In addition. Customs has ruled that ships providing
services to offshore oil facilities need not be
coastwise-qualified if they are not transporting material or
passengers between coastwise points. Foreign ice breaking
ships. diving support ships. and scientific vessels have
been used to this end. 36 Therefore. a legal regime has
been applied to the DCS whereby transportation services are
considered to be coastwise trade. while other types of
service are not. Moreover. a coastwise point on the DeS has
been defined as any vessel or structure attached permanently
or temporarily to the seabed which is in place for the
purpose of oil and gas exploration. production. or
development.
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In the event of expanding exploitation of OCS oil and
gas resources, the clear potential exists for a growing
employment of support ships such as those mentioned above.
On the one hand, U.S. support ship interests have argued
that foreign vessels will invade this sector of the maritime
unless it is reserved to U.s. vessels. Further, it is
claimed, those support services should be viewed as a type
of coastwise trade, and therefore should already be reserved
to U.s. ships.
On the other hand, users of these maritime service
vessels have a clear interest in maintaining a free market
choice in what nationality equipment they will employ. In
the middle is the Customs Service, which must rule whether
certain activities constitute coastwise trade. It is
perceived by some that Customs' policy toward the OCS is
favoring foreign shipping interests to the point where it
may allow them into a trade that should be protected. The
rUlings they have issued on the OCS have, while following
the letter of the law, often been seen as contrary to the
best interests of the U.s. merchant marine. Clearly, a more
focused and comprehensive policy should be developed
regarding the applicability of U.S. coastWise trade laws to
the OCS.
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NOTES
1. United States Constitution. Article I, sec. 8.
2. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 220 (1824).
3. North River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 747
(1825).
4. In an 1889 case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Southern District of Alabama overturned a lower court ruling
which exempted river navigation from the coastwise trade
laws. The Circuit Court held that exempting trade carried
out on the navigable rivers from "coastwise trade" was too
narrow an opinion. Ravesies v. U.S., 37 Fed. Rep. 447,
(1889).
5. In U.S. v. Morrison, 26 Fed. Cas. 579 (1846), the court
allowed the operation of an unlicensed river ferry within a
state, in violation of federal law. JUdge Wells held that
since the license required under the law was a coasting
license, then the act could not apply to the river ferry,
since "neither the phrase 'coasting trade,' nor the word
'coasting, I nor 'trade,' could with any propriety be applied
to a ferry across a river." Part of the reasoning cited in
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this case was the inconvenience to small ferries which might
be forced to leave their employment twice a year and travel
to be inspected, perhaps adding costly and time consuming
regulations to their employment. The holding effectively
removed all river ferries from the purview of existing
coastwise trade law, and may have had interesting
consequences for the make-up of inland fleets were it not
overturned. Judge Wells issued a similar ruling in 1852,
stating in part that the Constitution, in granting to
Congress the right to regulate commerce, does not also grant
it the right to regulate navigation. Here he clearly
refuted the Supreme Court's holding in Gibbons v. Ogden.
In an analagous case from the District Court for the
District of Maine, the court upheld a state law granting
exclusive navigation rights to the upper reaches of the
Penobscot River to a single operator. Veazie v. Moor, 14 L.
Ed. 567 (1852). The defendants were granted a 20 year
contract after they had done improvement work to a river
channel which was above four dams and inaccesible to the
open sea. The court reasoned that since the river was
entirely within the state of Maine, the commerce clause of
the Constitution was not violated.
6. Ravesies v. U.S., 37 Fed. Rep. 448 (1889).
7. Congressman Payne expressed frustration at the practice of
shipping goods from Seattle to Vancouver on an American ship
(about 90 miles) and then transferring them to a foreign
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U.S. Congress, House, Coni. Record. House vol. 31, Feb. 15,
1898, p. 1729. See also U.S. v. 250 Kegs of Nails, 61
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to Antwerp on one foreign vessel and then reshipped on
another foreign vessel to California.)
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12. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, sec. 4(a), August 7,
1953. 43 U.S.C. 1333a(1)). The purpose of the Act was, in
part, to see to it that the subsoil and seabed of the OCS
"appertain to the United States and are Subject to its
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition Id.
sec. 3.
13. U.S. Customs Service, TD 54281(1), Jan. 9, 1957.
14. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine &
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Fisheries, U.S. Customs Service. Hearing before the
Oversight and InyestigatiQns SubCQmmittee. July 23, 1985.
Hereafter cited as CustQms Oversight Hearing. TestimQny Qf
Edward B. Gable, DirectQr Qf Carriers, BQnds, and Drawback
DivisiQn, U.S. CustQms Service.
15. Outer CQntinental Shelf Lands Act Amendments. September 18,
1978, P.L. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629. The amendments were
prQmpted in part by CQncerns Qver dependence Qn fQreign Qil.
See the CQngressiQnal Findings in sec. 101 Qf the Act, where
CQngress fQund that "demand fQr energy in the United States
is increasing and will CQntinue tQ increase fQr the
fQrseeable future." 43 U.S.C. 1801.
The legislative histQry Qf that pQrtiQn Qf the
amendments affecting the OCS transpQrtatiQn regime indicates
that CQngress intended tQ extend federal law tQ all "devices
in cQntact" with the seabed. U.S. CQngress, HQuse, HQuse
RepQrt 95-590. p. 128. Printed in U.S. CQde CQngressiQnal
and Administrative News. VQl. 3, p. 1534. The OCSLA as
amended, therefQre, brQught within the purview Qf American
cabotage law "drilling ships, semi-submersible drilling
rigs, and other watercraft, when they are cQnnected to the
seabed by drillstring, pipes, or other appurtenances, on the
OCS fQr explQratiQn, develQpment Qr prQductiQn purpQses."
Id.
16. Id., sec. 4(a), 43 U.S.C. 1333(a).
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Serial No. 98-36.
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drill jacket fabricating company, called this process
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1985.
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Chapter V
EXCEPTIONS TO COASTWISE TRADE LAW
Although the consistent federal policy toward the
coastwise trade appears to have been one of protection,
certain circumstances have arisen necessitating exceptions
to this approach. Proponents of a restrictive coastwise
policy have argued that these exceptions tend to erode the
integrity of one of the most fundamental supports of the
u.S. merchant marine. Conversely, proponents of a free
trade system in the shipping industry point to the poor
competitive position of the coastwise shipping industry in
relation to the trucking, rail, and pipeline industries as
evidence that the regulatory burden is excessive and that
the coastwise fleet would be better able to compete with
land-based modes if the use of foreign tonnage was
permitted. They see the various exceptions to U.S.
coastwise law as part of a trend toward easing the
requirements for participation in the coastwise shipping
industry and possibly lowering the costs to shippers in the
process.
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There are several types of exceptions to U.S. coastwise
trade law, most of which allow easier entry to the coastwise
trade, but some of which restrict entry. This thesis will
outline some of the more important exceptions, without
attempting to cover them all. A thorough analysis of
coastwise trade exceptions would be an appropriate topic for
a separate paper.
As stated in earlier chapters, a ship engaging in a
cabotage activity in the coastwise area must have a
coastwise license. Simply put, the license is evidence that
the ship was U.S.-built, is U.S.-owned, and is
U.S.-documented. 1 Under certain circumstances, however, a
coastwise license may be issued to a ship that does not
fulfill all of the above requirements. Moreover, a
U.S.-flag ship with a registry (instead of a coastwise
license) may engage in some limited coastwise activity in
the entire coastwise area. Likewise, this type of ship may
be able to engage in any cabotage activity in limited
portions of the coastwise area. Further, a foreign-flag
ship may engage in limited coastwise operations, such as the
towing of foreign vessels or ships in distress between
coastwise points, or, in some cases, salvaging.
On the other hand, some U.S.-built, -owned, and
-documented Ships are prohibited from coastwise operation.
These. are primarily subsidized ships, although other vessels
are prohibited as well.
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ExceptiQns Restrictin~ Entry
Subsidized vessels
CQnstructiQn-Differential Subsidy
Vessels receiving federal subsidies are, with certain
exceptiQns, prQhibited frQm engaging in the dQmestic trade
Qf the United States. FQr example, a vessel built with a
cQnstructiQn-differential subsidy (CDS) may Qperate in the
fQreign trade, and may stQP at intercQastal Qr QffshQre
pQrts Qnly if a certain prQpQrtiQn Qf the vQyage revenues
are paid back tQ the Secretary Qf TranSPQrtatiQn. 2
HQwever, the Secretary may authQrize the transfer Qf CDS
built vessels intQ the dQmestic trade Qf the United States
for nQt mQre than six mQnths in a year, if that helps carry
Qut the purpQses Qf the Act. 3 FurthermQre, the Secretary
Qf TranspQrtatiQn issued a final rulemaking Qn May 7, 1985
that allQwed CDS-built tankers tQ pay back the subsidy with
interest and enter the cQastwise trade. 4
The CDS repayment issue erupted in the 1970s when the
Maritime AdministratQr, James S. DawsQn, permitted the full
repayment Qf a CDS fQr the tanker Stuyvesant in exchange fQr
permissiQn tQ Qperate in the Alaskan Qil trade. 5 Maritime
grQups SQught tQ Qverturn this decisiQn thrQugh the cQurts
but were unsuccessful, the Supreme CQurt hQlding that the
Secretary had the pQwer tQ permit a full repayment. 6 The
Reagan administratiQn's pQsitiQn Qn this issue is that
remQval Qf Qbstacles tQ free market chQice in the
utilizatiQn Qf tanker tQnnage will imprQve the stature Qf
the cQastwise fleet. 7 In additiQn, the Department Qf
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Transportation (DOT) held in its final rule that "there are
a number of tankers currently laid up and more could be laid
up, in part as a result of this rule, but these tankers are
generally old, small and inefficient and have only remained
in service until now because of the lack of competition from
suitable vessels. ,,8 Although the Reagan administration
has supported the principles of U.S. coastwise trade law,
the CDS payback policy is seen by some as an attack on
existing coastwise operators. since many coastwise-qualified
tankers are incapable of competing against the CDS-built
ships.
Operating differential subsidy
Vessels are prohibited from receiving operating-
differential subsidies (ODS) on voyages in the coastwise
trade under the 1936 Act. 9 However. ships receiving these
subsidies are entitled to make intercoastal stops on a
round-the-world voyage, a voyage from the west coast to
Europe. a voyage from the east coast to the Orient, or a
foreign voyage with a stop at Hawaii or the Pacific
possessions. if some of the ODS is paid back. 10
Ships Rebuilt Abroad
The second proviso of the Jones Act prohibits the use
of ships in the coastwise trade that have been rebuilt
abroad. The section states:
"That no vessel of more than five hundred gross tons
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which has acquired the lawful right to engage in the
coastwise trade ... and which later has been rebuilt
shall have the right thereafter to engage in the
coastwise trade, unless the entire rebuilding,
including the construction of any major components of
the hull or superstructure of the vessel, is effected
within the United States ... "11
The purpose of the amendment, as stated by its sponsor
in Congress. was to provide work for the U.S. shipyard and
ship-repair industry "in order to enable the shipyards to
keep their skilled workers and their facilities in readiness
for any emergency. "12 It was felt by some in the
administration that the issue of foreign conversion or
reconstruction work was not a major problem at the time,
and, although they did not object to the bill, two important
changes were suggested. 13 First was a limit of one
thousand tons, so that ships under that size could be
rebuilt abroad without penalty. However, the bill as
enacted contained a limit of 500 tons, rather than 1000
tons. This represented a compromise between the bill's
original language and the position of some in the
administration, which was to provide a 1000 ton cut-off such
that ships under that size could be repaired abroad without
forfeiting coastwise privileges. Second was that the narrow
definition of rebuilding be taken out of the bill so that a
prior Supreme Court definition of the term, subsequently
used in Customs' regulations, would be retained. 14 This
suggestion was also incorporated in the bill and was quickly
at issue after the passage of the law.
Specifically, the use of foreign midbodies in the
reconstruction of a coastwise-qualified ship, not prohibited
by the language of the 1956 amendment, was allowed by the
Customs Service without forfeiture of coastwise
privileges. 15 A 1960 amendment to the Jones Act
specifically sought to close this loophole, because it was
felt that the use of foreign midbodies in the reconstruction
of coastwise-qualified ships "would permit a frustration of
the intent of Congress that vessels of foreign construction
shall not be permitted to operate in the coastwise trade of
the United States. ,,16
The 1960 amendment did not end the confusion
surrounding this issue, however. A Circuit Court found in
1970 that if part of a non coastwise-qualified ship is
attached to part of a coastwise-qualified ship, the
resulting ship might be coastwise-qualified, depending on
where the actual rebuilding took place. 17 Although the
ruling would appear to be in contradiction to the 1960
amendment and its legislative history, that amendment deals
only with components of forei~n construction. and does not
address components of U.S. construction which may have been
part of a non coastWise-qualified ship, such as one that had
been under foreign ownership. 18 In other words, a
component of foreign construction would taint a rebuilt
vessel so that it would forfeit its coastwise privileges.
The Coast Guard, which enforces this statute, considers
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a ship to have been rebuilt outside the U.S. when either:
1. a considerable part of its hull or superstructure is
rebuilt or altered outside the U.S.; or 2. a major component
of the hull or superstructure. which is foreign-built. is
added to the vessel. 19 Therefore. a ship would apparently
not have to be entirely rebuilt in the U.S., as is specified
in the statute. An example of rebuilding work permitted in
foreign yards is the hotel work of a cruise ship, since such
work does not fit one of the two criteria outlined above.
Ships Sold or Reiistered Foreiin
Coastwise qualified ships that are sold or registered
abroad are also prohibited from engaging in the coastwise
trade, and the Coast Guard requires, as part of its
documentation process, proof of a continuous chain of U.S.
ownership. 20 The first proviso of the Jones Act states:
"That no vessel having at any time acquired the
lawful right to engage in the coastwise trade ...
and later sold foreign in whole or in part, or
placed under foreign registry shall hereafter
acquire the right to engage in the coastwise
trade. ,,21
The purpose of this amendment was to preclude the
coastwise use of U.S.-built vessels that were sold foreign
or built for a foreign account. 22 At the time, some 174
U.S.-built ships were under the foreign flag, many of which
had been built for foreign ownerShip during World War I or
were sold abroad as surplus by the Shipping Board after the
war. The perception was that U.S. shipbuilding would be
encouraged by eliminating the possibility of these ships
reentering the coastwise trade and undercutting existing or
proposed services. 23 Moreover, some 250 war surplus ships
owned by the Shipping Board were in layup and could be
purchased for coastwise use. 24
An interesting question arises at this point regarding
the rebuilding and sale-foreign provisos outlined above.
Specifically, the main body of the Jones Act refers to the
transport of merchandise. whereas both of these modifying
provisos refer to ship operation in the coastwise trade.
The question is this: may the language of a proviso be
broader than the statute that it modifies? In other words,
may the proviso bar operation in the coastwise trade,
including passenger carriage, when the main statute applies
only to merchandise carriage?
The reasoning used in the 1980 Great Lakes dredging
case was that the "a cardinal rule of statutory construction
is that the scope of a proviso is no broader than the
language it modifies. "25 This would seem to have
implications for the owner of, for example, a U.S.-built
passenger vessel which has been sold, registered, or rebuilt
overseas. The original Jones Act clearly deals only with
merchandise and, under the court's reasoning, should not
prohibit a reflagged passenger vessel of this type from
engaging in U.S. coastwise operations. 26
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A 1970 Circuit Court of Appeals case, on the other
hand, established that there was no evidence to suggest that
Congress intended the sale-foreign proviso to apply only to
carriers of merchandise. 27 The Court essentially upheld
Customs' position that .. the proviso was intended to have an
effect independent of the main clause of (the Jones
Act). 1128 The federal courts seem to have added to the
confusion, then, by ruling in one case that the provisos are
independent of the main statute, and in another case that
the provisos are not broader than the main statute.
Exceptions Easin~ Entry
Emer~ency Exceptions
Periodic attention has been given to the use of foreign
ships in the coastwise trade, particularly during times of
conflict when there have been shortages of
coastwise-qualified tonnage. Waivers of this sort have been
granted as a temporary blanket provision by Congress, where
any foreign ship could operate in the coastwise trade. More
recently, discretionary powers have been given to the
President to waive necessary laws when deemed appropriate.
In addition, it has been perceived to be in the best
interest of the country to waive vessel-inspection law in
times of emergency, and.this discretionary power has been
given to the President as well. 29
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World War I
The decision of the Wilson administration to send
American troops to France in 1917 created a severe strain on
existing shipping services and had a number of unusual
consequences. One of these was a Congressional
appropriation of $2,884,000,000 for ship construction,
enough money at the time to triple the existing world
commercial fleet. 30 In addition, foreign ships in American
ports were commandeered, and U.S. ships both under
construction and in operation were requisitioned. 31
Further, one of the earliest exceptions to U.S. coastwise
trade policy was enacted as a result of American involvement
in World War I, when the federal government allowed foreign
ships to operate between U.S. ports to relieve the wartime
shortage of tonnage. It lasted for the duration of the war
plus 120 days, and was repealed at the end of the war. 32
Although there was some resistance to this measure from
U.S.-flag carriers, it had support in the federal
government. In the opinion of the U.S. Shipping Board,
American shipping interests "would best be conserved by
a permission to use ... during this present war or
emergency, foreign-built and foreign-registered ships in our
coastwise trade. ,,33
It was felt, therefore, that the best interests of the
country would be served by_ allowing U.S. coastwise ships to
operate on the trans-oceanic runs, and foreign ships to
operate in the coastwise trade. Such an arrangement was
made necessary by the withdrawal of allied shipping at the
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outset of World War I and the insufficient tonnage under the
U.S. flag to compensate.
Administrative Waivers
There are other methods by which an otherwise
unqualified vessel -- foreign-flag or foreign-built may
operate in the coastwise trade. One method is through an
administrative waiver. 34 The Secretary of the Treasury is
required to waive compliance with the coastwise trade laws
if so requested by the Secretary of Defense. These waivers
are granted in the interest of national defense. although
they do not always involve emergencies. In addition.
Treasury may waive compliance with the coastwise trade laws
on its own initiative. or on the recommendation of the head
of any other agency. if the interest of the national defense
warrants the waiver. 35
Most of the initial waivers (15 of the first 19) were
requested by the Commerce Department and waived the
requirement of a Coast Guard certificate of inspection at
the time of documentation. Other waivers have been
initiated or requested by Treasury. the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Interior, the Atomic Energy
Commission, and the Federal Aviation Administration, among
others. 36 In general, they are granted for a specified
time period. although some a~e for a certain number of
voyages. 37 Not all waivers have met with public approval
or acquiescence, however. A 1970 waiver granted by Treasury
for the tanker Sansinena. a 70,000 ton, U.S.-built vessel
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which had been foreign-owned and -documented met with such
an outcry that it was withdrawn almost immediately.38
Foreign Vessel Acquisition
A further method by which a non coastwise-qualified
vessel may operate in the coastwise trade is through the
Emergency Foreign Vessels Acquisition Act. 39 Whenever the
President decides that the national security makes it
advisable, or during any national emergency declared by him,
he may, through the Secretary of Transportation. purchase or
requisition "any merchant vessel not owned by citizens of
the United States which is lying idle in waters within the
jurisdiction of the United States and which the President
finds to be necessary to the national defense. ,,40
Moreover, the vessel may be documented as a U.S. vessel and
may then be chartered to any U.S. public or private operator
for use in the coastwise trade.
The President, therefore, has the discretionary power
not only to allow foreign ships to operate in the coastwise
trade, but to force them to do so. if they are found in U.S.
waters. As outlined above. the administrative waiver
authority has been used relatively infrequently and is
primarily a tool to bypass the strict requirements of U.S.
coastwise trade law when it is perceived to be in the best
interests of the nation to do so. Such a policy would seem
to be consistent with the traditional role of the merchant
marine to further the security interests of the United
States. 41
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Wrecked vessels. War Prizes. and FQrfeitures
Certain ships in the coastwise trade may be exempt frQm
the requirement that they be U.S.-built and cQntinuQusly
U.S.-Qwned. Unlike ships admitted under an administrative
waiver, they must be U.S.-dQcumented (with a cQastwise
license) and U.S.-Qwned when they enter cQastwise service.
FQr example, a fQreign-built vessel may be granted a
cQastwise license if: 1. it was captured as a war prize Qr
forfeited under U.S. law;42 Qr 2. it was a wrecked
vessel and repairs tQ the vessel dQne in a U.S. shipyard
-- CQst at least three times the appraised salved value Qf
the vessel, as determined by the CQmmissiQner Qf
CustQms. 43
The wrecked vessel pQlicy was initiated in 1852 and was
similar tQ present law in all respects except that the
Qriginal statute did nQt specify that repairs had tQ be
perfQrmed in the United States. 44 It was prQbably assumed
at the time that a Ship that was wrecked in U.S. waters
WQuld have nQ choice but tQ undergQ repairs in a U.S. yard.
NQt surprisingly, there has been SQme disagreement between
shipyards and ship QperatQrs Qver the value Qf this
exemptiQn. This disagreement was illustrated by the
intrQductiQn Qf a bill in CQngress in 1898 tQ allQw the use
Qf wrecked vessels Qnly in the U.S.. fQreign trade. AlthQugh
the prQvisiQn was nQt passed intQ law, shipyard interests
maintained that it was detrimental tQ U.S. cQastwise trade
pQlicy tQ allQw the use Qf fQreign-built wrecked vessels in
-151-
that trade, since "every foreign-built wrecked vessel, after
being repaired and admitted to enrollment in the coastwise
trade ... takes from American shipbuilders the building of a
new ship. ,,45 The purpose of the bill, therefore, was "to
compel a better adherence to the established policy ...
prohibiting foreign-built vessels from taking part in the
American coastwise trade to the injury of American-built
vessels in that trade
In 1915, perhaps indicative of the quid pro quo of
maritime policymaking, the wrecked vessel statute was
revised to expressly require that repairs on any wrecked
vessel be done in U.S. shipyards if the intent was to
document the vessel for the coastwise trade. 47 On the one
hand, shipyards favored the 1898 bill, which would have
stopped the use of foreign-built wrecked vessels in the
coastwise trade, while on the other hand, ship operators
probably favored no change to the existing policy.
The poliCy regarding documentation of war prizes and
forfeitures originated in 1792, and likely was an effort to
beef up the post-war merchant fleet with ships captured at
sea. 48 However, there was some resistance to allowing war
prizes to be used in the coastwise trade, and this feeling
surfaced during the House debate prior to passage of the
law. 49 In an effort to show how other nations approached
the issue of war prize documentation,. French law was cited,
which did not allow a war prize to be registered under the
French flag, despite the fact that they were engaged in a
war. 50 Nevertheless, the provision survived the debate and
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remains part of U.S. documentation law.
Ownership Exceptions
Bowater Act of 1958
A limited type of coastwise license may be issued to a
ship that satisfies the requirements for a coastwise
license, except for the 75% domestic ownership.51
Essentially, the corporation that owns the ship may be owned
by a foreign citizen or corporation, although ships that
qualify under this law may not transport merchandise or
passengers, or engage in the fisheries in the U.S. except as
a service to a parent or subsidiary corporation. The ship
must also be chartered to a common carrier for use other
than in the domestic noncontiguous trades. The common
carrier may not be connected to the corporation that owns
the ship. The common carrier must be a "citizen" under
section 2 of the 1916 Shipping Act. 52 While initially
easing the requirements for entry into the coastwise trade,
the Bowater Act strips most of the advantages through
imposition of strict rules.
The Bowater Act was deemed necessary because the U.S.
ownership principle of the cabotage laws at times merited
"minor exceptions ... if equity and justice is to be
done: n53 The law was named after Bowaters Southern Paper
Corporation of Tennessee, a supplier of. newsprint to a
number of well-known American newspapers, including the
Washington Post. 54 Bowaters was wholly owned by a
Canadian company, however, and therefore was ineligible to
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own a coastwise vessel. The Congress felt that this
presented Bowaters with an undue hardship and, since the
company's employees were 98% American and virtually all of
the supplies and finished products were bought or sold here,
there was a need to ease the participation obstacles for
Bowaters and similar companies. 55 As a tradeoff, and to
appease concerns of the measure's opponents, companies
utilizing the provision could not engage in common carriage
and could not use self-propelled ships of greater than 500
gross tons. 56 Therefore, Congress attempted to
simultaneously mitigate the competitive disadvantage
experienced by a small number of companies, and maintain the
overall protection afforded by the cabotage laws.
GeQ~raphic Exceptions
Jones Act Provisos
The main body of the Jones Act, as outlined in a
previous chapter, is a strict provision that leaves very
little room for ambiguity in its application. There are,
however, several provisos to the Jones Act, most of which
relate to vessel operation in specific geographic areas,
which make it possible for foreign-flag ships or non
coastwise-qualified ships to engage in limited coastwise
activities.
Part of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 allowed any
foreign-built ship that had been U.S.-registered to engage
in the coastwise trade, as long as it was owned by an
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American on February 1, 1920 and remained under U.S.
ownership.57 This provision, seemingly contrary to the
strong protectionist language of the Jones Act, was probably
intended to augment the post-war coastwise fleet. The first
and second provisos, outlined earlier in this chapter, deal
with foreign registry, sale, or rebuilding and are
restrictive in nature.
Third Proviso. The third proviso is the only among the
present ten that was part of the original statute. As
originally enacted, it exempted from the Jones Act any
merchandise transported between U.S. points by way of
Canada, if part of the movement was on a foreign ship.58
The purpose of this was to allow the movement of cargo from
the U.S. on rail routes through Canada to a Canadian port
and then on a Canadian or any other flag ship back to the
United States. It is unclear why Alaska was specifically
exempted from this proviso, since it is not normally
considered part of the continental United States. Since the
proviso did not apply to Alaska, cargo shipped from the U.S.
via Vancouver, Canada to Alaska would have to travel on U.S.
ships from Vancouver to Alaska. It may be that Wesley
Jones. a Washington Senator who spearheaded passage of the
Jones Act, was careful to prevent any possible cargo
diversion from Seattle to Vancouver in the U.S. to Alaska
trade.
The Alaskan exception was at issue almost immediately
after passage of the Jones Act and a bill was introduced in
the 67th Congress that proposed two changes to the Act. 59
The first was to change the word "excluding" to "including."
The second was to add another proviso which exempted the
Yukon River until the Alaskan Railroad had been completed
and proper facilities had been established for water
transportation by Americans. In hearings on the bill, the
point was brought out that the original "excluding Alaska"
wording served to discriminate against Alaska because of the
strict U.S.-flag requirement for shipments originating in
the U.S. 60 For example, a shipment- could originate in
Boston, travel via the Canadian railroad to Vancouver, and
be shipped on a foreign vessel from Vancouver to a
California port. However, if the merchandise was destined
for Alaska, the ship would have to be American. Some in the
fishing industry were opposed as well, and it was felt that
the fishermen of Alaska could be the hardest hit i£ American
fishing companies closed operations there due to the higher
transport costs of using U.S.-flag shipS.61
On the other hand, American steamship representatives
were vehemently opposed to any bill allowing Canadian ships
to carry U.S.-origin cargo from Vancouver to Alaska. 62
They saw the original proviso of the Jones Act, which
allowed this type of operation to other west coast ports, as
brought about by Canadian interests. They perceived that
these interests, having gained a foothold in the U.S.
coastwise trade during World War I, were reluctant to let it
go.
Despite the arguments in favor of the bill, these
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provisions did not become part of the Jones Act until much
later. The Yukon River section was not passed into law
until July 2, 1935. 63 Moreover, the Jones Act excluded
Alaska from its "through-Canada" exemption until July 7,
1958, when the word "excluding" was changed to
"including. ,,64
A more recent effort was made to repeal the third
proviso entirely because of concern that it allows abuses of
the Jones Act. It was felt at the time of introduction of a
bill in 1983 that, although there was little use made of the
proviso, it did leave the door open for shippers to divert
their cargo to Canadian ports to make use of foreign
carriers in the mainland U.S. to Alaska trade. 65
Fourth Proviso. A fourth proviso was added in 1935 whiCh
exempted from the application of the Jones Act the Yukon
River "until the Alaska Railroad shall be completed ... " and
a finding is made that U.S. citizens have established
transportation services on the river. 66 An official of
the National Merchant Marine Association had testified at
the 1921 hearing in opposition to the Yukon River exemption.
stating that "by misinterpretation of the coastwise laws of
the United States· ... British-flag vessels upon the Yukon
River were granted authority by governmental departments of
the United States to enter into competition upon tnat river
with American carriers. 67
Fifth Proviso. Another geographically-related proviso was
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added to the Jones Act in 1935. 68 It exempted merchandise
and passengers carried aboard U.S.-built and -documented
Great Lakes railroad ferries that are owned by a Canadian
common carrier. One of the main purposes of the amendment
was to allow Canadian-owned ferries operating in conjunction
with an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) approved
railroad to transport rail cars across the Great Lakes, an
activity that supplemented rail movement between points in
the United States. 69 Often these rail movements would
pass through Canada and it was felt that allowing
Canadian-owned car ferries to operate without penalty would
help keep the Great Lakes channels open for navigation. 70
It is unclear whether Canadian interests perceived this
proviso to be to their benefit, since only the ownership·
requirements were waived. At any rate, the Customs Service
recently determined that there had been no activity under
the fifth proviso since at least 1980. 71
Exceptions to the Passenier Ship Act of 1886
The Passenger Ship Act, in addition to the regUlatory
exemptions outlined in chapter three, has three exemptions
specifically enacted to relieve hardships brought on by the
lack of coastwise-qualified vessels. It might be argued on
the one hand that the regulatory loopholes and statutory
exemptions have made it difficult for U.S.-flag passenger
vessels to get started in the business. However, the
statutory exemptions were provided because of a lack of
U.S.-flag service to some remote places and they are, in
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fact, rarely used.
In 1938, Canadians were allowed, upon receiving an
annual permit, to operate passenger ships between Rochester,
New York and Alexandria Bay, New York "until such time as
passenger service shall be established- by vessels of the
United States. ,,72 It is doubtful whether there is still a
need for this statute, since it has not been used for at
least 16 years. 73
In 1961, Congress enacted another exception to the
Passenger Ship Act, allowing foreign ships to transport
passengers between ports in southeastern Alaska. 74 The
legislative history indicates that the exception was
necessary because the "increased vessel operating costs, and
... the small and fluctuating seasonal population in the
area in question (meant) U.S.-flag vessels ... found such
service uneconomic. ,,75 Thus, many of the remote ports in
the southeastern Alaska region would likely have been cut
off from service without the presence of Canadian ships.
The Customs Service has found that, while two Canadian-flag
ships have served the Alaskan market in the past under the
1961 exception, "there would appear to be no justification
today" for the 1938 and 1961 Passenger Ship Act
exceptions. 76 It is interesting that so few of the
exceptions to U.S. coastwise trade law appear to be
utilized, given the frequent calls for easing the entry_
requirements.
A third exception to the Passenger Ship Act was passed
into law in 1983, and allowed carriage of passengers between
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Puerto Rico and the United States on non-qualified passenger
shipS.77 The purpose of the provision was two-fold.
First, it provides an alternate means of travel for
islanders who, for medical or other reasons, are unable or
unwilling to fly. Second, it was intended to spur the
island's economic development through increased tourism. 78
The measure was also supported by the Reagan administration,
which has not generally approved of measures weakening U.S.
coastwise law. 79 Maritime unions and trade groups opposed
the measure, fearing that it would undermine efforts to
bring U.S.-flag, U.S.-built passenger ships into
service. 80
Other geographically related, "activity-specific"
exceptions have been enacted in recent years. For example,
in 1962, cabotage restrictions were waived for lumber
shipments originating in Pacific coast ports, the purpose of
which was to aid the west coast lumber industry.81
Moreover, foreign-built ships under two hundred gross tons
are permitted to trade fisheries products between places in
Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana islands. 82
Territories and Possessions
The strict coastwise requirements covering the
territories and possessions have been relaxed to some extent
in recent years. For example. ships engaging in the
coastwise trade with Guam, American Samoa, Wake, Midway, and
Kingman Reef may have a registry endorsement which, of
course, means they may be foreign-built, although they must
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still be U.S.-flag. 83 Moreover, there is no requirement
regarding the flag of a vessel trading between U.S. ports
and the Virgin ISlands,84 American Samoa,85 the Northern
Mariana Islands86 and Canton Island. 87 Therefore, ships
of any flag may engage in any coastwise activity with these
islands.
It may be argued that while the Jones Act broadened the
applicability of the coastwise laws in 1920, their scope was
weakened by the various exceptions granted to island
territories and possessions subsequent to that law. Some
insight may be gained into the rationale behind this policy
by looking at the hearings on the Virgin Islands' exemption.
The Interior Department's spokesman cited President Hoover's
1931 visit to the islands and his characterization of them
as an "effective poorhouse" as impetus for reviving the
area. 88 It was felt that successful economic development
of the islands was linked to a less restrictive shipping
policy and, in fact, a series of temporary suspensions of
the coastwise laws had been in effect in the Virgin Islands
prior to the permanent exemption. 89 In addition to the
passenger trade served by foreign vessels, bunkering was a
mainstay of the St. Thomas commerce at the time and much of
the coal and oil came from the U.S. mainland. The feeling
was that the difference in price between a U.S. vessel and a
foreign vessel bringing the bunkering supplies was
significant and that irreversible harm would be caused if
only U.S. vessels were allowed in the trade. 90
There was some concern, however, that the measure would
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act as the "nose of the camel under the tent" in breaking
down the coastwise laws, and there was even speculation as
to whether foreign interests were pushing the bill. 91 In
any event, while all U.S. territories and possessions have
been included in the coastwise area since 1920, many areas
have since been statutorily excluded. This exclusion may
apply only to a specific coastwise activity, such as
passenger carriage, or it may apply to all coastwise
activities.
Miscellaneous Exceptions
A variety of other exceptions, most of which are
limited in scope, have been enacted at various times to
relieve perceived inequities in the law, or shortages in
available tonnage. Some of these are outlined below,
although it is not intended that this be an exhaustive list.
Shipping Act of 1916
Under the Shipping Act of 1916, a U.S. citizen may
purchase, charter, or lease a vessel from the Secretary of
Transportation. 92 This includes foreign-built vessels and
these ships may be used in the coastwise trade of the United
States while they are owned, leased or chartered by the
1nd1vidual. 93 The Secretary must approve the transfer of
these ships. This exception was originally intended to
offset the scarcity of shipS in the U.S. foreign trades that
existed at the outbreak of World War I. Almost all
U.S.-flag ships at the time were employed in the coastwise
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trade and, as stated earlier, the withdrawal of foreign
commercial shipping from the U.S. foreign trades left
American shippers with increasing freight rates and forced
coastwise vessels into the foreign trades. 94
Shipping conditions which motivated the enactment of
such an exception to coastwise trade law can not be said to
exist today. Ships could not be built fast enough for the
market and the demand for shipping services was greater than
the supply of ships. This is clearly not the case
presently, especially in the coastwise trade, and therefore
the exception provided for in the 1916 Shipping Act would
appear to be inconsistent with the general trend of
coastwise trade policy.
Jones Act Provisos
In addition to the geographically related provisos
previously mentioned, the Jones Act contains exceptions
which are specifically designed to mitigate hardships to
certain types of coastwise operators, and they include the
sixth, seventh, and final provisos. 95 Essentially, they
allow foreign operators to relocate containers or associated
equipment between U.S. ports, and to transfer merchandise
from one LASH barge to another in U.S. waters, as long as
the merchandise is bound to or from a foreign port. 96 In
addition, fish processing and assembly gear aboard U.S.
fishing vessels is classified as ship's equipment rather
than merchandise. 97 It is argued that because of the
limited scope of these coastwise trade exceptions. they are
-11
less an expression of federal coastwise trade policy than a
logistical relief to fishing vessels and certain liner
operators in the u.S. foreign trade.
Legislative Exemptions
If all else fails, Congress may enact special
legislation to exempt any ship from the requirements of the
coastwise trade. Private laws of this type are enacted
every Congress, although it is rare that a major,
commercially useful Ship is included because of strong
opposition from interest groups and the federal government.
An exception to this was the granting of coastWise
priVileges to the passenger ships Independence and
Constitution in 1978 and 1981. Both ships are now operating
in the Hawaiian inter-island trade. Normally·, hearings are
held to determine the nature of the vessel, the
circumstances prohibiting its entry into the coastwise
trade, and the likely impact that ship would have on the
existing coastwise fleet.
Despite the strict standards with which a ship and
owner must comply in order to participate in the coastwise
trade, the federal government has seen fit, albeit with a
great deal of reluctance in some cases, to grant certain
exceptions to the cabotage requirements. Occasionally these
exceptions are granted for national security reasons, but
more frequently to mitigate a perceived hardship on a part
of the country or on a constituency that might otherwise go
without service, perhaps functioning in the process to help
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develop the more remote sections of the country.
Naturally, maritime interests fought these exceptions
when they were perceived to be contrary to their best
interests, and it felt by some that they represent a
significant erosion of the principle of cabotage
protection. 98
-165-
1. See 46 U.S.C. 121.
2. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, section 506, 46 App. U.S.C.
1156.
3. Id.
4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration,
"Construction-Differential Subsidy Repayment; Total Payment
Policy," Federal Re~ister. vol. 50, no. 88, May 7, 1985, pp.
19170-19178. This rule will primarily affect the Alaskan
oil trade, since the great majority of coastwise-qualified
tankers are employed in that trade. Any tanker operator
that has paid back CDS funds and interest by June 6, 1986 is
eligible to enter the coastwise trade.
5. See Robert W. Gruendel, "The Weakening Grip of United States
Cabotage Law," Fordham International Law Journal. vol. 4,
pp. 404-407.
6. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S.
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Chapter VI
CONCLUSION
This study has traced the development of the legal
regime governing domestic maritime transportation, dredging,
towing, and salvage, and has attempted to show that the
requirements for participation in these activities vary
depending on the type of service provided and the area in
which it is undertaken. Further, it has been demonstrated
that the Congress, the federal courts, and the executive
agencies charged with oversight of the coastwise trade have
all participated in the shaping of a protectionist policy
toward U.S. domestic shipping.
It is clear that the reservation of the coastwise trade
to American ships has been among the most protective
components of U.S. maritime policy. The protection extends
to both the operators and builders of coastwise vessels, in
most cases, and also to the ownership of the vessels. All
foreign-flagged, -built, and -owned ships have been barred
from U.S. coastwise operation since 1817 and, with a few
exceptions, the cabotage principles have tended to become
more stringent since that time.
In addition, individual states have no authority to
make coastwise trade policy. The Constitution granted to
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the Congress and the federal courts the power to make and
interpret, respectively, laws relating to commerce and
navigation. California, for example, is not permitted to
enact legislation allowing foreign ships to undertake
coastwise activities in its waters. The rationale for this
is that it is in the best interests of the nation as a whole
to maintain a uniform, consistent federal maritime policy
that applies to all navigable waters of the United States,
so that economic and strategic benefits accrue to all states
equally. 1
Customs, the lead agency in enforcing U.S. cabotage
law, considers coastwise trade to be the transportation of
merchandise and passengers, towing, and salvage. The
agency's rUlings, while following the letter of the law,
have tended to err on the side of protecting U.S. shipyards
and ship operators. For example, the wording of the
Passenger Ship Act and the towing statute could be construed
to allow participation by U.S.-flag, forei~n-built ships in
certain cabotage activities, although Customs has ruled that
only U.S.-built ships qualify, and by so doing, has actively
safeguarded domestic shipping rights for U.S. interests.
Having identified a history of protection in the
coastWise trade, an obvious question presents itself:
should this protection be continued? Have the benefits to
the nation as a whole equalled or exceeded the extra cost to
shippers associated with using domestically constructed and
operated ships? The number of ships operating and being
constructed for operation in the coastwise trade help answer
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this question. Data from the Maritime Administration
indicate that only 177 ships currently ply the coastwise
trade with unrestricted privileges and of this number, 52
are in the Alaskan oil trade and operate virtually without
competition from other modes2 (see Appendix E, p. 195).
In fact, 84 of the 177 ships in the U.S. coastwise fleet
operate in the offshore trades -- such as the mainland to
Hawaii, Alaska, or Puerto Rico routes -- and are free from
competition from overland modes of transport. 3 Despite
their per unit cost advantage, ships have carried a
decreasing proportion of coastal commerce since World War
II, while trucks, railroads, and pipelines have assumed
greater proportions. 4 Because of this, some have
advocated allowing foreign ships to engage in cabotage
activities, thereby reducing costs to shippers. and
subsequently to consumers. 5
It is proposed that two policy changes be pursued with
respect to the coastwise trade with the final objective
being the revitalization of a U.S.-flag domestic fleet.
First, the application of U.S. cabotage law should be
expanded to include all commercial shipping services
provided in U.S. waters and on the oes where artificial
islands are in place for resource exploitation activities.
This would bring activities such as cruises-to-nowhere and
offshore oil and gas rig services under the purview of the
coastwise trade laws, thereby mandating strict U.S.
involvement.
The second change would be to ease the participation
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requirement for ships in the coastwise trade such that
foreign-built ships, as well as ships that have been rebuilt
or sold abroad, would qualify for coastwise operation as
long as they are under the U.S.-flag. Under this regime,
all repairs or modifications to ships would have to be
undertaken in U.S. yards. This is likely to cause a
significant reduction in costs of U.S.-flag operation,
although it is uncertain whether the savings would be
sufficient to capture cargo from other transportation
modes.
The historical analysis presented in this thesis
supports an initiative of this type. It has been shown that
all three branches of the federal government participated in
the formulation of a protectionist cabotage policy. It can
be argued, however, that after the 1906 dredging law, new
developments in the coastwise trade were not met with new
legal initiatives, other than to update existing law.
Consequently, lower cost foreign ships have exploited
emerging non-transportation maritime services, such as
cruises-to-nowhere, because these activities have not been
reserved for U.S. ships.
Despite this phenomenon, U.S. public policy has
consistently called for the promotion of the merchant marine
for both economic and strategic reasons. The existing legal
framework is not accomplishing this promotion, although the
change outlined here would attempt to rectify the situation
by encouraging the growth of an American coastwise fleet.
The beneficiaries of this Change include domestic Ship
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operators and crews since revenues and wages would accrue to
U.S. companies and seamen. The federal government would
benefit from the receipt of tax revenues as well. Likewise,
the intangible security benefit to the nation as a whole
would be enhanced by an increase in the number of American
ships and trained seamen.
Further, the use of lower cost foreign-built, U.S.-flag
tonnage would encourage efficiency and competitiveness on
the part of the ship operators. In the transportation
industry, this would help the operators reduce freight rates
and might result in lower costs to the consumer. In other
service industries, the costs to the consumer would depend
on the extent to which the operator keeps expenses at the
same level as the foreign operators who had been providing
that service.
Several problems will need to be addressed in order to
make such a policy successful. One is that port costs may
be so high that the cost reductions achieved through the use
of foreign-built ships would be insignificant by comparison,
so that coastwise operators providing transportation
services are still not able to compete with land-based
modes. In addition, shipyards will undoubtedly complain
about a change of this type, although it may be that
shipyards would actually benefit from such a policy shift,
because U.S. yards are bUilding very few ships for the
domestic trades at present anyway. and requiring that
repairs be performed in domestic yards could stimulate
shipyard activity.
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A further problem confronting implementation of this
policy is the fact that some U.S. operators have established
themselves under the existing legal regime, and could be
adversely affected by competing against carriers with lower
operating costs. 6 An arrangement which will mitigate this
impact -- possibly remunerative -- may have to be created.
Moreover, some foreign-flag operators presently engaged in
coastwise service activities would be affected by the
proposal outlined above. These operations include passenger
cruise ships which sail to and from ports such as Miami, Los
Angeles, and New York on cruises-to-nowhere. Local ports
derive significant economic benefits from these operations
and would certainly oppose any measure that would cause
foreign-flag ships to be banned from U.S. ports. It may
thus be necessary to allow existing foreign-flag ships to
operate without penalty in some coastal services under a
"grandfather" provision. Further, an incremental approach
to allowing foreign-built tonnage in the coastwise trade
might be taken whereby the domestic construction requirement
is removed on a piecemeal basis. For example, vessels in
certain trades,or vessels over a certain tonnage might be
exempted from the build-America requirement initially, with
incremental additions to the exemption.
The objective of the policy change outlined here is to
create an atmosphere where U.S~-flag coastwise shipping can
be revitalized. It is assumed by this author that the
declarations of policy outlined in the Merchant Marine Acts
of 1920 and 1936 are still valid. and that retaining
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expertise in ship operation and management, as well as
construction and repair is a desirable goal. The proposed
policy change outlined in this study is a partial response
to the growing importance of coastal service operations
above and beyond traditional merchandise transportation
which is addressed by the Jones Act. It is hoped that by
stimulating U.S. participation in growing marine service
activities in the coastwise area, the competitive posture of
the U.S. merchant marine will be improved.
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1. See for example the Declaration of Policy of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920, 46 A~~. U.S.C. 861, and the Declaration
of Policy of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 Ap~. U.S.C.
1101.
2. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration,
Priyatel~ Ow»ed Tankers ~nd Dry Cario Vessels with
Unrestricted Domestic Tradini Priyileies of 1.000 Gross Tons
and Oyer as of March 1. 1985. 14 pp. In addition, only
about 16 ships were on order for the Jones Act trades for
delivery between October, 1983 and December, 1985. See
Clinton H. Whitehurst, American Domestic Shippini in
American Sh1ps; Jones Act Costs. Benef1ts and Opt1ons.
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985, 47
pp. Hereafter cited as Whitehurst. 1985.
3. Naturally, these offshore areas are free to receive goods
from foreign nations aboard any flag vessel, and this has a
tendency to maintain competition for freight.
4. See Clark G. Reynolds, "American Maritime Power Since World
War II," in America's Maritime Legacy: A History of the
39-
U.S. Merchant Marine and Shipbuildin~ Industry Since
Colonial Times. Robert A. Kilmarx, ed., Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1979, p. 227.
6. See Whitehurst. 1986 .. See also Clinton H. Whitehurst, %he
U.S. Merchant Marine, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute
Press, 1983, 314 pp.
6. A study done by the Transportation Institute on general
cargo carriage between the Pacific Northwest and Alaska
estimated that if new foreign-built containerships were
allowed to operate between the U.S. mainland and Alaska, the
corresponding drop in freight rates would drive the existing
carriers out of business. The study further estimated that
freight costs make up only about 1.7% of the cost of
finished consumer products in Alaska, so the lower freight
rates would not be reflected in lower consumer prices.
Transportation Institute, Jones Act Coordinating Committee,
"Foreign-Built Vessels in the Alaska Liner Trades: Effect
on Consumer Prices and Existing Vessel Service," June, 1983,
11 pp.
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APPENDIX A
Eliiibility fQr CQast Guard Documents fQr the
FQreiin and DQmestic Trades
I. Vessels Eligible fQr DQcumentatiQn.
A vessel Qf at least 5 net tQns nQt registered under
the laws of a foreign cQuntry is eligible fQr dQcumentatiQn
if the vessel is Qwned by --
(I) an individual whQ is a citizen Qf the United
States;
(2) an assQciation, trust, jQint venture, Qr Qther
entity --
(A) all Qf whQse members are citizens Qf the
United States; and
(B) that is capable Qf hQlding title tQ a vessel
under the laws Qf the United States Qr Qf a State;
(3) a partnership whQse general partners are citizens
Qf the United States, and the cQntrQlling interest in
the partnership is Qwned by citizens of the United
States;
(4) a cQrpQratiQn established under the laws Qf the
United States or of a State, whQse president Qr Qther
chief executive Qfficer and chairman Qf its bQard Qf
directQrs are citizens of the United States, and nQ mQre
Qf its directQrs are nQncitizens than a minQrity Qf the
number necessary tQ cQnstitute a quQrum;
(5) the United States GQvernment; Qr
(6) the gQvernment Qf a State.
II. Registry.
(a) A registry may be issued fQr a vessel eligible fQr
dQcumentatiQn.
(b) A vessel fQr which a registry is issued may be
emplQyed in fQreign trade Qr trade with Guam, American
SamQa, Wake, Midway, or Kingman Reef.
(c) On application of the owner of a vessel that
qualif1es for a coastwise license under section 12106 of
this title, a Great Lakes license under section 12107 Qf
this title, or a fishery license under sectiQn 12108 Qf t.his
title, the Secretary may issue a registry apprQpriately
endQrsed authQrizing the vessel tQ be employed in the
coastwise trade, the Great Lakes trade, or the fisheries, as
the case may be.
(d) Except as prQvided in sectiQns 12106-12108 Qf this
title, a foreign-built vessel registered under this sectiQn
may nQt engage in the cQastwise trade, the Great Lakes
trade, Qr the fisheries.
III. CQastwise Licenses and Registry.
(a) A coastwise license Qr, as prQvided in sectiQn
12105(c) of title, an apprQpriately endorsed registry, may
be issued fQr a vessel that --
(I) is eligible fQr dQcumentatiQn;
(2)(A) was bUilt in the United States; Qr
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(B) if not built in the United States, was captured
in war by citizens of the United States and lawfully
condemned as prize, was adjudged to be forfeited for
a breach of the laws of the United States, or
qualified for documentation under section 4136 of the
Revised Statutes (46 App. U.S.C. 14); and
(3) otherwise qualifies under the laws of the United
States to be employed in the coastwise trade.
(b) Subject to the laws of the United States regulating
the coastwise trade and the fisheries, only a vessel for
which a coastwise license or an appropriately endorsed
registry is issued may be employed in --
(I) the coastwise trade; and
(2) the fisheries.(c) a coastwise license to engage in the coastwise
trade of fisheries products between places in Guam, American
Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands may be issued for a
vessel that --
(I) is less than two hundred gross tons;
(2) was not built in the United States;
(3) is eligible for documentation; and
(4) otherwise qualifies under the laws of the United
States to be employed in the coastwise trade.
Source: United States Code. title 46. sections 12102.
12105. 12106.
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APPENDIX B
Domestic Bu1ld and Ownersh1p Character1st1cs Necessary
for U.S. Documents
Document
U.S.-
Built
U.S.-
Owned1
Co&stw1se
X
X X
1. See Appendix C for further information regarding
ownership requirements.
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APPENDIX C
Entities Which Qualify as a U.S. Citizen
Document
Individual
of U.S.
Citizenship
Govt. of a
State or
Possession.
Fed. Gov't.
Partnership1
Coastwise
X
X
X
75% U.S.-
owned.
X
X
X
Majority
U.S.-owned.
Association O2Joint Venture
Corporation3
Trust4
X
75% U.S.-
owned.
X
X
Majority
U.S.-owned.
X
1. All the general partners must be U.S. citizens.
2. Each member must be a U.S. c~t~zen.
3. The corporation must be incorporated under the laws of
the United States. In addition, the chief executive
officer, chairman of the board, and a majority of the
number of directors necessary to constitute a quorum
must be U.S. citizens.
4. All of the trustees and beneficiaries must be U.S.
citizens.
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APPENDIX D
Domestic Participation in the Coastwise Trade
Geographic Area
Am. Samoa2 Midway3
NMI King. Reef
Puerto Canton Is. Wake
OCS4O.S.l Rico VI Guam
Merch. BUilg5 Build Build
transp. Flag Flag Flag Flag
Pass. Build Build
transp. Flag Flag Flag
Dredging7 Build Build Build Build
(Guam only)
TOWing Build Build Build
Flag Flag Flag Flag
Salvage Flag
1. The navigable internal and territorial waters of the
States of the United States, including the District of
Columbia.
2. Includes American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands,
Canton Island, and the Virgin Islands.
3. Includes Midway, Kingman Reef, Wake, and Guam.
4. Includes structures attached to the Outer Continental
Shelf of the United States for the purposes of oil and
gas exploitation between the seaward boundary of the
territorial sea and the seaward boundary of the
Continental Shelf.
5. The vessel must be built in the United States.
6. The vessel must be U.S.-flagged.
7. The dredging statute applies to Guam, but not to the
Virgin Islands by an Opinion of the Attorney General
dated August 13, 1963. Other island possessions have
not been ruled on, although it is unlikely the dredging
statute would be held applicable to them.
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APPENDIX E
Breakdown of Ships Actively Operatin~ with Unrestricted
PriYile~es in the Coastwise Trade
Type of Ship Area of Operation
Number in
Operation
Average Age
(Years)
TANKER Alaska 51 12
Gulf/Atlantic 48 16.8
Gulf/Pacific 6 24
Atlantic/Gulf/
Pacific 2 18.5
Atlantic 2 22.5
Pacific 8 18.8
Gulf 6 11.5
Puerto Rico/
Virgin Islands 3 17.7
LPG
TUG/BARGE
CHEMICAL
TANKERS
Alaska
Gulf/Atlantic
Atlantic
Gulf
Gulf/Atlantic
Gulf/Atlantic/
Pacific
1
4
2
2
3
1
8
9
4
5.5
16
15
SULPHUR
TANKERS
BULK
PASSENGER
CONTAINER
COLLIER
ROLL-ON
ROLL-OFF
BULK/OIL
TUG/BARGE
-196-
Gulf/Atlantic
Gulf
Atlantic/Pacific
Hawaii
Hawaii
Alaska
Puerto Rico
Hawaii
Atlantic
Alaska
Puerto Rico
Hawaii
Gulf/Atlantic
Gulf
Atlantic/Gulf/
Pacific
Hawaii
1
2
1
1
2
6
6
5
1
2
5
1
1
2
1
1
18
17.5
21
12
34
17.7
17.8
12
2
9
10.6
3
4
10
9
3
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration, Priyatel~ Owned Tankers and Dry
Car~o Vessels with Unrestricted Domestic Trading
Privileges of 1.000 Gross Tons and Over as of March
1. 1985. 14 pp.
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